比特币现金难度调整机制对比特币的潜在影响

摘要:在这篇文章中,我们将探讨比特币现金新的24小时动态难度调整算法对比特币网络的潜在影响。我们也看看两个加密货币之间的哈希率波动对比特币现货价格走势可能造成的影响。

 

概述

在我们的上一篇文章中,我们探讨了共享相同哈希算法加密货币的历史以及与两个相应加密货币之间的哈希值波动有关的潜在问题。在这篇文章中,我们更仔细地看看比特币,以及其价格与比特币现金价格的相应变化。

比特币拥有比比特币现金更长的难度调整期,调整期约两周,而比特币现金的日调整机制是相对动态的。因此,如果价格走势改变而使得两个区块链上的采矿激励改变,比特币的调整速度将会比比特币现金缓慢,其目标区块间隔时间为10分钟。就可用性或完整性来说,这可能是比特币网络的潜在问题。

 

比特币现金价格上涨实例

而这篇文章的其余部分,广义上讲,我们假设矿工的目标是在短期内实现利润最大化。事实上,矿工也可能考虑其他因素,或者有其他目标,例如希望看到他们支持的加密货币成功,不支持的加密货币失败,或者他们可能试图通过保持网络稳定来确保他们原先投资的加密货币或采矿硬件的长期价值最大化。

 

以下情况适用于比特币现金价格呈上涨趋势,该逻辑可以用于其他价格变动:

 

  1. 稳定且均衡状态是存在的,每个加密货币大致达到其10分钟的目标区块间隔时间,并且哈希散布率与每个加密货币的价格成比例地分配。
  2. 比特币现金的价格上涨。
  3. 比特币现金的挖矿所带来的盈利会比特币高,大量的哈希率便转移到比特币现金。
  4. 在一天之内,比特币现金的难度重新定位机制很快就会调整,比特币现金区块的间隔时间在10分钟左右。
  5. 由于比特币现金的难度提高了,部分哈希率会回到比特币区块链上。比特币区块间隔超过10分钟,因为并不是所有的哈希率都同一时间转移回来。
  6. 在大约两周后,比特币的难度重新定位机制就会调整,而比特币的区块间隔再次达到10分钟。更大的哈希值回到比特币,这样哈希率分布大致与两个加密货币相对价格(一个均衡状态)成比例。

 

下表通过实际的数字说明了上面例子。

 

哈希率动态波动图 – 比特币现金的价格上升时

初始状态 价格上涨后 比特币现金难度调整后 比特币难度调整后
比特币 1.0 BTC 1.0 BTC 1.0 BTC 1.0 BTC
比特币现金 0.2 BTC 0.4 BTC 0.4 BTC 0.4 BTC
相对采矿收益率
比特币 1.00x 1.00x 1.00x 1.17x
比特币现金 1.00x 2.00x 1.00x 1.17x
预计哈希分散率
比特币 83.3% 0.0% 66.7% 71.4%
比特币现金 16.7% 100.0% 33.3% 28.6%
预计区块间隔
比特币 10 分钟 n/a 12.5 分钟 10 分钟
比特币现金 10 分钟 1.7 分钟 10 分钟 10 分钟

资料来源:BitMEX 研究

备注:上述是一个简化模型,并排除了几个哈希率波动的阶段。该表假定哈希率是根据两个加密货币的相对价格水平而分配的。交易费用造成的影响被排除在外。

 

对比特币网络的潜在影响

以上说明由于比特币区块链较长的难度调整窗口,其相较比特币现金会经历更长的波动区间。然而,数据还显示,即便比特币现金的价格波动较大,从0.2比特币到0.4比特币不等,也只会在比特币现金难度调整之后,将比特币区间预期间隔时间增加25%,到12.5分钟。


这些较慢的区块可能会在比特币区块链上造成一些额外的交易拥塞。然而有点讽刺的是,比特币现金支持者可能比比特币支持者更担心这个问题。很多长期的比特币持有者可能不会关注这个12.5分钟的间隔区间,因为他们展望长期的未来,而这个问题也会在两周内被解决。虽然这可能会对中期用户造成某些不良影响,但我们认为,比特币现金不会在长时间内一直维持如此高的价格波动水平。所以上述问题未必是一个严重的问题。

 

然而,价格波动和哈希率波动可能会持续很长一段时间。如果是这样的话,虽然比特币偏离10分钟间隔区间的情况可能会维持较长时间,但比特币现金的偏差幅度可能更大。这可能对两个加密货币都有不良的影响。


如果发生这种情况,最终可以合并采矿而达到纳什均衡博弈解决方案,就像我们在上一篇文章讨论过的那样。然而由于当前的对抗性政治气候,达成这样的解决方案可能需要相当多的时间和理解。

 

比特币现金难度调整计划旨在造成干扰

比特币现金社区内可能有一些小的团体希望破坏比特币网络。例如,有些人可能试图将比特币现货价格上涨的时机与EDA造成难度下调结合起来,以驱使矿工进入比特币现金并破坏比特币网络。

 

如果计划的目的是造成破坏,一个可能的方法是增加难度调整期,例如从日窗口期改到两个月的窗口期。这意味着,在比特币现金急剧上涨之后,比特币现金的困难调节需要比比特币调节的时间更长。因此与比特币相比,比特币现金可能会在更长时间保持盈利,可能会从而导致比特币网络中断和交易拥堵。


然而,像这样的长期困难调整窗口可能与比特币现金原则相违背。较短的调整周期,较大的区块和较少的区块时间间隔提高了实用性,这是比特币现金的一大优势。相比之下,较长的难度调整期,较小的区块和较长的区块间隔可能会提高韧性,这似乎是比特币的关键优势。因此,我们认为比特币现金不太可能采取这样的政策。


这个较长的两个月的难度调整窗口的另一个问题是,在较少的区块的情况下,对比特币现金造成的不良影响会比比特币更大。因此这种方法可以被认为是一种两败俱伤的情况。正如我们上面所表达的,最终,双赢的情况可能是合并采矿。

 

 

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BitMEX (www.bitmex.com)

2014年莱特币与狗币的算力竞争及其对比特币与比特币现金的影响

摘要:在这篇文章中,我们将探讨2014年莱特币(LTC)和狗币(DOGE)之间的哈希率波动。我们将其与当前比特币(BTC)和比特币现金(BCH)哈希率波动进行比较,并研究是否可以从“历史”中学习。

 

概述

尽管有许多不同的加密货币,但实际上拥有自己的矿工和采用工作量证明机制的加密货币的数量是非常少的。因此,任意两个加密货币采用工作量证明机制并共享相同的散列算法是非常罕见的。在区块链历史上,哈希率波动似乎有三个重要的实例:

 

年份 加密货币 哈希算法
2014 莱特币(LTC) vs 狗币(DOGE) Scrypt
2016 以太币(ETC) vs 以太币经典(ETC) EtHash
2017 比特币(BTC) vs 比特币现金(BCH) SHA256

资料来源:BitMEX 研究

 

在我们看来,透过对比2014年莱特币(LTC)与狗币(DOGE)和2017年比特币(BTC)与比特币现金(BCH)哈希率波动,我们可能会得到一些启发。

 

2014年初,狗币的价格突然大幅上涨(图1),激励了采矿诱因,从而吸引了大量算力到狗币的网络上。这与比特币现金恶名昭彰的EDA类似,导致挖矿难度急剧下降,使得比特币现金在某些短暂的时间内比比特币的采矿诱因更高。两种情况都将导致加密货币之间的哈希率急剧波动,从而导致算力在网络上的分布各有不同。

 

许多人在fork.lol网站上查询比特币和比特币现金之间的哈希率波动。由于上述相似之处,我们将回顾一下2014年发生的事件。我们将附上这个期间的图表,显示一些可能我们的读者不太熟悉的哈希率波动。

 

采矿激励与难度调整机制

理论上讲,两个使用同样哈希算力的加密货币之间的哈希率分布应该和其区块链上采矿激励总值成比例。矿业激励可以被认为是在任何特定的时间段内,预期区块奖励和交易费用的美元价值。

 

即使在加密货币价格,区块奖励和交易费用水平稳定的情况下,在短期内,在难度调整期间,可能会发生进一步哈希率波动,因为矿工可能切换到难度较低的更有利可图的加密货币链上,直到难度调整到平衡位置。


2014年的莱特币vs狗币

在2014年初,狗币价格大幅上涨,然后开始挑战莱特币,成为最高的哈希率的Scrypt加密货币。莱特币的目标区块间隔时间为2.5分钟,难度为每3.5天调整一次,相比之下,狗币的目标区块间隔时间为1分钟,2014年初则为4小时。

 

图1 – 2014年莱特币(LTC)与狗币(DOGE)价格图 – 美元

资料来源:Coinmarketcap,BitMEX 研究

 

尽管如图2所示,狗币的价格比莱特币在2014年初涨幅要快得多,但是狗币从未真正接近过莱特币的市值。尽管市值较低,但狗币的通胀率较高,这意味着矿工的回报往往更高,因此在某些时期大部分的Scrypt哈希率都转移到了狗币的网络上。

 

图2 – 2014年莱特币(LTC)与狗币(DOGE)市值表 – 百万美元

资料来源:Coinmarketcap,BitMEX研究


如下图3所示,1月下旬和2014年2月,狗币的哈希率比莱特币要高。两个加密货币之间在1个月左右的时间里经常出现周期性的变化,大部分矿工都在两个区块链上来回切换。


图3 – 2014年莱特币(LTC)与狗币(DOGE)哈希率图 – 每秒十亿次哈希

资料来源:莱特币区块链,狗币区块链,BitMEX研究

 

在2017年,在比特币现金每时间单位采矿奖励比比特币高的时候,许多矿工切换到比特币现金的区块链上。但是,这一情况似乎是在2014年首先发生的。如下图4所示,矿工们“跟着钱”走。

 

一个关键的区别是,即使在难度调整到均衡水平之后,在某些时期,狗币仍然处于领先地位,就采矿奖励美元价值而言。相比之下,比特币现金的激励主要是由难度调整算法中的异常所驱动。在每个区块上,比特币总是比比特币现金有更高的采矿激励。而因为比特币现金可以在同一时间内生产更多区块,所以有更多的激励,但只要难度恢复到平衡水平,比特币就保持了作为SHA256哈希算法最高激励的加密货币的地位。


图4 – 2014年莱特币(LTC)与狗币(DOGE) – 采矿激励(美元/日)vs 哈希率

资料来源:Coinmarketcap,莱特币区块链,狗币区块链,狗币 Github,BitMEX 研究

备注:采矿奖励的计算不包括交易费用

 

为了计算狗币的采矿激励,我们不得不考虑2014年发生的各种事件,其中包括六次对区块激励机制的更改和两次硬分叉事件。下表中列出:

 

图5 – 狗币(DOGE)2014活动时间表

日期 区块数 事件类别 预计区块奖励 注解
二月十四日  100,000 采矿奖励变更  250,000 500,000 随机奖励0到50万个狗币
三月十七日  145,000 硬分叉 250,000 250,000 难度再定位时间从4小时减少到1分钟。随机性从区块奖励中删除了。
四月二十八日  200,000 采矿奖励变更 125,000 250,000
七月十五日  300,000 采矿奖励变更 62,500 125,000
九月十一日  371,337 硬分叉 启用了兼容莱特币的合并挖矿
十月二日  400,000 采矿奖励变更 31,250 62,500
十二月十四日  500,000 采矿奖励变更 15,625 31,250

资料来源:狗币区块链,狗币Github,BitMEX研究


如上表所示,2017年3月17日,狗币改变了难度调整算法,将目标区块间隔时间减少到仅仅1分钟(1个区块),试图减轻哈希率波动所造成的一些干扰。

 

合并采矿

最终,在2014年9月,狗币启动了其合并采矿的硬分叉。合并采矿是指在一条区块链上完成的工作也可以被认为是另一条区块链上的有效工作。因此,狗币可以被认为是莱特币的“辅助区块链”,因为狗币包含额外的数据元素,该数据包括莱特币区块头的哈希值,这被认为是狗币有效工作的证明。

 

合并采矿系统被认为是解决哈希率波动问题的最终解决方案,即使在加密货币价格急剧波动的情况下也能确保稳定性。


对比特币现金的潜在影响

我们认为,也许出于政治原因,比特币现金社区在中期内不太可能希望实施合并采矿。比特币现金社区的一些人认为比特币是一个竞争区块链,而不是一个能够与之和平共处的区块链。允许合并采矿可以被视为两个链条之间的最终和平安排。最初,一些在狗币社区的团体对合并挖掘也不满意,但社区最终意识到这是他们解决哈希波动问题的最佳方案。

 

然而,比特币现金最近修复了EDA问题,我们在9月初首先强调了这一个潜在的问题需要被修复。也许新的日难度的调整机制,加上价格趋向稳定后,可以解决哈希率波动的问题,而不需要被修复。然而如果这仍不能解决问题,那么在合并采矿之前,可能需要尝试另外的难度调整计划。

 

 

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BitMEX (www.bitmex.com)

Revisiting “The DAO”

Abstract: In this piece, we revisit “The DAO” and the events following its failure. We analyse what happened to the various buckets of funds inside The DAO, on both sides of the chainsplit that it caused. We identify US$140 million of unclaimed funds still inside what is left of The DAO.

Key points

  • The DAO hacker appears to control tokens worth approximately US$60 million.
  • There are currently around US$140 million of unclaimed funds still inside The DAO withdrawal contracts.
  • In June 2017, the USD value of unclaimed funds inside The DAO was higher than the value of the amount initially raised in May 2016.
  • After a 10 January 2018 deadline, around US$26 million of the funds may no longer be available to be claimed.

The DAO marketing material from May 2016

(Source: DaoHub)

Overview

In the early summer of 2016, a project called “The DAO” generated a substantial amount of excitement in the crypto space. DAO stands for Decentralized Autonomous Organization, and to the confusion of many, The DAO (as the group styled its name) consumed that entire moniker for itself. The DAO was to be an autonomous investment fund, investing in projects determined by the token holders. The fund was to be governed by a “code is law” philosophy, as opposed to the centralised top-down control mechanisms in traditional investment funds, where key individuals matter.  

Many believed this novel approach would lead to superior investment returns. Although it is a unique and potentially interesting approach, expecting strong investment returns at this point may be somewhat naive.

The fund raised Ethereum tokens worth approximately US$150 million at the time, around 14% of all the Ether in existence, with investors presumably expecting spectacular returns. The downside risk was expected to be minimal or even zero, since one was supposed to be able to withdraw one’s Ethereum from The DAO whenever one wished. In reality, doing so was a complex and error-prone process.

Problems with The DAO

As it turns out, The DAO was fundamentally flawed on several levels, as many in the Ethereum Foundation pointed out before the exploit was discovered.  For instance:

  • Economic incentives — The incentive model of the project was poorly thought out. For example, there was little incentive to vote “no” on investment proposals, since “no” voters became invested in approved projects. Those that did not vote did not become exposed to the project. Additionally, there was no stated mechanism for forcing successful projects to contribute profits back into The DAO.
  • Token viability — The creation of new projects would have ended up creating new classes of DAO tokens, such that each class was entitled to different risks and rewards. This meant that the tokens would not be fungible, an issue poorly understood by exchanges and the community.
  • Buggy code — The code did not always implement what was described or intended.  The smart-contract code did not appear to be adequately reviewed. The coders did not appear to fully grasp its language, Solidity, nor some of the states the contract could reach.

A few weeks after the conclusion of the token sale, a hacker found an exploit in the code that allowed them to access The DAO’s funds and drain some of it into a child DAO over which the hacker potentially had significant control. This led to an Ethereum hardfork, which was an attempt to prevent the hacker from controlling the funds and to return the funds to the initial investors. Since some in the Ethereum community were unhappy about this, it lead to the chainsplit between ETH and ETC.

The main groups and individuals related to The DAO

Network map of the main groups and the individuals involved in The DAO. There are other Ethereum foundation members with no association with The DAO, who are excluded from the diagram. Blue circles represent individuals;  yellow circles represent organisations. (Source: BitMEX Research)

 

Description People involved
DAOHub.org A DAO community website promoting The DAO, hosted by DAO.link. Felix Albert , Auryn Macmillan, Boyan Balinov, Arno Gaboury, Michal Brazewicz ,  Taylor Van Orden , Des Donnelly, Daniel McClure (source)
Slock.it Slock.it wrote the code for The DAO and the company was hoping to develop smart locks. Slock.it was expected to be financed by The DAO. Stephan Tual, Lefteris Karapetsas, Griff Green, Christoph Jentzsch, his brother Simon Jentzsch, Gavin Wood, Christian Reitwießner (source)
The hacker The exploiter of The DAO. Anonymous
DAO token holders (DTH)

Individuals from the general public who contributed to The DAO crowd sale or purchased DAO tokens on the open market.

22,873 account holders (source)
The DAO curators Third-party arbitrators separate from Slock.it who manage disputes or emergency situations arising from The DAO. Taylor Gerring, Viktor Tron, Christian Reitwießner, Gustav Simonsson, Fabian Vogelsteller, Aeron Buchanan, Martin Becze, Vitalik Buterin, Alex Van de Sande, Vlad Zamfir, Gavin Wood (resigned as a DAO curator prior to the exploit) (source)
Bity A Swiss based cryptocurrency exchange in partnership with Slock.it. The exchange publishes WHG announcements. (source) Alexis Roussel (source)
DAO.Link A Swiss-registered joint venture of Slock.it and Bity, which hosts the DAOHub website. Stephan Tual, Simon Jentzsch, Alexis Roussel (source)
Robin Hood Group (RHG) The original “white hat” group, which secured the majority of The DAO funds pre-fork.

Publicly: Alex Van de Sande, Griff Green, Lefteris Karapetsas

Stephan Tual claims: “individuals from the eth foundation, devs, security experts, ethcore, slock, etc.” (source)

Whitehat Group (WHG) The organisation that took ownership of ETC from the RHG.  The WHG has close ties to Bity. Only publicly known members are Jordi Baylina and Griff Green (source)
The Ethereum Foundation Non-profit foundation behind the creation of Ethereum. Many individuals including some of the founders of Ethereum (source)

The DAO timeline

In order to fully understand and account for the proper ownership of the funds, we must revisit the provenance of The DAO funds before, during, and after the hardfork.

Date Event Movement of funds
30 April 2016 The DAO crowdsale is launched. (Source: Slock.it)
25 May 2016 The DAO crowd sale concludes. ~11.5 million pre-fork ETH raised.
17 June 2016 The DAO is drained into a child DAO by the hacker.
(Source: New York Times)
~3.6 million pre-fork ETH drained to hacker’s child DAO.

A child DAO can be split from the main DAO as part of The DAO’s governance process, similar to a spin-off company.

The splitting process was exploited by the hacker using a recursive-call exploit, which drained more funds from the parent DAO than intended. The owner of a newly formed child DAO cannot withdraw those funds immediately but must wait for a voting period to end before securing those funds and being able to freely transfer them.

This voting period gave the Ethereum community a window of opportunity to attempt to reclaim the funds by attempting to exploit the hacker’s child DAO using the same vulnerability. This, however, might have resulted in perpetual splitting and a DAO war, whereby the funds would be stuck in limbo forever as long as neither the hacker nor RHG gave up. This process could be easily scripted so would not take much effort on either side.

One way to solve this would be the implementation of a softfork to censor the hacker’s transactions, preventing them from participating in this war and quickly allowing the funds to be recovered.

Date Event Movement of funds
21 June 2016
RHG begin “DAO Wars” and are able to to recover a majority of the funds. (Source: Reddit)
~8.1 million pre-fork ETH drained into the RHG’s child DAOs using the same vulnerability.
24 June 2016
DAO Wars softfork proposed to secure attacker’s ~3.6 million pre-fork ETH. (Source: Ethereum Foundation)
Would have censored transactions to prevent hacker from accessing their child DAO.
28 June 2016
Critical flaw discovered in DAO Wars softfork, which is then abandoned (Source: Hacking Distributed)

At this point, the RHG had managed to secure around 70% of the funds by exploiting other child DAOs, but in order to guarantee the ability to reclaim the remaining 30% (around 3.6 million pre-fork ETH), a hardfork was the only possibility. Moreover, the softfork proposal was found to have critical security vulnerabilities and was quickly scrapped.

Date Event Movement of funds
20 July 2016
Hardfork is implemented, effectively undoing the effects of The DAO hack and making DTH whole on the forked ETH chain. Implemented via two withdrawal contracts.
(Source: Ethereum FoundationThe Ethereum Wiki)
~11.5 million post-fork ETH returned to DAO withdraw contract, which can be claimed by DTH based on their current DAO token balances.
20 July 2016
ETC, the not-forked chain. continues to be mined.
The RHG and The DAO hacker will eventually have access to ETC in child DAOs.

After the fork, there are two chains in parallel universes: ETH, where the hack is undone, and ETC, where the hack remains. The RHG have still secured around 70% of the ETC, and could have continued the attack on the ETC chain using the aforementioned “DAO Wars” limbo strategy, but decide not to. To refund DTH on the ETH chain, a withdrawal contract is used, which DTH must call to claim their ETH.

Date Event Movement of funds
23 July 2016
ETC is listed on Poloniex; other exchanges follow suit. ETC/USD reaches a third of ETH/USD. (Source: Twitter) n/a
9 Aug 2016
The RHG hands ownership of the ETC funds to the WHG. The WHG receive funds in their ETC multisig wallet as the ETC child DAOs mature. (Source: Bity)
~8.1 million ETC secured by the WHG.
10 Aug 2016
Unannounced, WHG/Bity use Bity’s “verified money service business” account to attempt to tumble and swap 3 million ETC on four exchanges for ETH, BTC, and EUR. (Source: Bity)
Poloniex freezes 2.3 million ETC, Kraken trades but freezes 1.3 million worth of ETC, Bittrex trades and processes 82,000 ETC, and Yunbi trades and processes 101,000 ETC.
12 Aug 2016
After the majority of the tumbled ETC is frozen, WHG/Bity announce that they have decided not to sell the ETC for ETH, and instead will distribute ETC to DTH. (Source: Reddit)
Bity trade back BTC, ETH, and EUR into ~1.5 million ETC, bringing their balance back to ~8.1 million ETC.

Graphical illustration of the above transactions

(Source: Gliffy)

 

Date Event Movement of Funds
26 Aug 2016
Bity announce launch of the “whitehat withdrawal contract”. (Source: Bity)
n/a
30 Aug 2016
Bity announce that the first version of the whitehat withdrawal contract is published. (Source: Bity)
~4.2m ETC transferred from WHG to the withdrawal contract, ~0.6 million claimed by DTH.  DTH are entitled to receive funds based on their DAO token balance at the time of the hardfork, not the current token balance as is the case for ETH.
30 Aug 2016 Bity announce that second version of whitehat withdrawal contract is published. (Source: Bity)
~3.8 million ETC transferred from old contract to new contract.
6 Sept 2016
Bity announce that the remaining ETC (including that which was attempted to be traded on exchanges, and some from matured child DAOs) is transferred to the whitehat withdrawal contract. (Source: Bity)

~4.3 million ETC transferred from WHG exchange accounts and multisig into withdrawal contract.

During the time these trades were made, the price of ETC dropped in value relative to ETH, BTC, and EUR, causing the trade back into ETC to yield an additional 700,000 of ETC that was added to the whitehat withdrawal contract. The exact details of these on-exchange swaps were not made public.

Graphical illustration of the above transactions

(Source: Gliffy)

 

Date Event Movement of funds
6 Sept 2016
DAO Hacker moves the funds from his “dark child DAO”. (Source: Gas Tracker)
~3.6 million ETC Secured by Hacker
6 Sept 2016 DAO hacker donates some ETC to the ETC development fund. (Source: Gas Tracker)
1,000 ETC sent to ETC developer fund.
25 Oct 2016 to
7 Dec 2016
DAO hacker tumbles funds into many different accounts, potentially swapping to different currencies. (Source: Gas Tracker)
~0.3 million ETC tumbled by hacker.

At the time of writing, the hacker has not touched the vast majority of the drained ETC, and is sitting on a stash of 3,360,332 ETC worth US$58 million.

One feature of the whitehat withdrawal contract is that a limit is set for the ETC funds to be withdrawn (originally set to three months, expiring on 30 January 2017). Due to the large proportion of the funds that were not claimed within the given three months, this period was extended twice.

Date Event Movement of funds
30 Jan 2017
Bity extend the ETC whitehat withdrawal contract deadline to 14 April 2017. (Source: Bity)
n/a
14 April 2017
RHG extend the ETC whitehat withdrawal contract deadline to 10 January 2018. (Source: Reddit)
n/a
10 Jan 2018
ETC whitehat withdrawal contract deadline. ?

There have been no major events since; the vast majority of ETH funds have been withdrawn by DTH, as has the majority of ETC.

The unclaimed funds

As of 19 November 2017, approximately US$140 million in funds remains unclaimed, as the approximate breakdown below indicates.

Bucket ETH Unclaimed US$ million Percent
Claimed balances
ETH withdrawn by DTH 11,286,046 97.3%
Unclaimed balances
Unclaimed ETH in DAO Withdraw (source) 235,414 86.6 2.0%
Unclaimed ETH in DAO ExtraBalance (source) 76,204 28.0 0.7%
Unclaimed total 311,618 114.7 2.7%
Claimed & unclaimed
Total funds 11,597,664   100.0%

DAO-related funds on the ETH side of the fork, calculated at a USD/ETH price of $368. (Source: BitMEX Research, Ethereum blockchain)

 

Bucket ETC  US$ million Percent
Hacker funds
ETC retained by Hacker 3,642,408 66.6  30.1%
WHG Funds
ETC withdrawn by DTH (including donations) 7,035,319 58.2%
Unclaimed ETC (Source) 1,405,072 25.8 11.6%
WHG total 8,440,391   100.0%
Hacker & WHG funds
Total funds 12,082,799

DAO-related funds on the ETC side of the fork calculated at a USD/ETC price of $18.30. (Source: BitMEX Research, Ethereum Classic blockchain)

 

 

DAO-related funds on the ETC side of the fork. (Source: BitMEX Research, Ethereum Classic blockchain)

 

Unclaimed DAO balances over time for ETH and ETC. (Source: BitMEX Research, GitHub)

 

Unclaimed DAO balances over time, in USD. (Source: BitMEX Research, Coinmarketcap, GitHub)

 

As the chart above illustrates, at the Ethereum price peak in July 2017, the USD value of unclaimed Ethereum inside DAO withdrawal contracts was even higher than the US$150 million initially raised.

Withdrawal contract “gotchas”

Whilst the notion of a withdrawal contract sounds binding, all of the unclaimed funds are still in the control of the owners of those contracts.

Safety hatches

All three withdrawal contracts have “safety hatch” mechanisms, meaning the owners of these contracts have the ability to withdraw all of the funds at any time.

Whilst The DAO curators have not indicated this is planned, it may be tempting to appropriate these funds if it is deemed that no more withdrawals will take place. The WHG, in contrast, have designed their contract specifically to ensure this happens.

Whitehat deadline

The whitehat withdrawal contract also has a timeout system for when DTH are able to withdraw their funds. This deadline will expire on 10 January 2018 (although it has been extended twice before), so attempts to withdraw after this deadline may be denied.

What next for the US$26 million of unclaimed ETC?

The next obvious question is what happens to the unclaimed funds on 10 January 2018.

There are four clear options at present:

  1. Have WHG/Bity keep the funds as payment for their service, returning some of the ETC.
  2. Donate the funds to a charity or the “community”, perhaps the ETC, DTH, or ETH community.
  3. Extend the deadline again.
  4. Commit to allowing withdrawals indefinitely, as with the ETH withdrawal contracts.

An official response from Bity suggests that they may lean towards option two:

We feel that these funds should be donated to the DAO token-holders community where they originated from. After six months, we want to be able to donate these unclaimed funds to a community-wide effort, like a foundation supporting smart-contracts security. We want these funds to be used to develop the future of structures of decentralized governance, DAOs, and smart contracts. We will see what options are available at the time.

Of course, questions of who represents the DTH community will arise, and the transparency of spending the funds may come into question. Due to the anonymity of whoever is behind WHG, it may be difficult for the community to properly audit the spending of these unclaimed funds.

Additionally, this arbitrary deadline that prevents individuals from claiming funds that are rightfully theirs may result in future legal action. Given that, there is a possibility that WHG is only left with option 3 or 4, and will potentially allow ETC withdrawals to continue in perpetuity.

However, January 2018 will be over 18 months after The DAO, a long time in the crypto space. In addition to this, the price of both ETH and ETC has risen considerably since The DAO. Therefore, some DTHs may forget about their tokens in all the excitement and wealth generation, which is prevalent in the Ethereum ecosystem.

Disclaimer

Whilst many claims made in this note are cited, we do not guarantee accuracy. We welcome corrections.

The implications for Bitcoin of the new Bitcoin Cash difficulty adjustment mechanism

Abstract: In this piece we examine the potential impact of Bitcoin Cash’s new rolling 24 hour difficulty adjustment algorithm on the Bitcoin network.  We look at the possible implications of price movements of Bitcoin Cash, with respect to hashrate oscillations between the two coins.

 

Overview

In our last piece we looked over the history of coins sharing the same hashing algorithm and some of the potential problems related to swings in the hashate between the two respective coins.  In this piece we look more closely at Bitcoin and how it could be effected by changes in the price of Bitcoin Cash.

Bitcoin has a longer difficulty adjustment period than Bitcoin Cash, a two week adjustment windows, compared to the rolling one day period Bitcoin Cash now has.  Therefore, in the event of price movements changing relative mining incentives between the chains, Bitcoin will be slower to adjust and achieve the the 10 minute target time than Bitcoin Cash.  This could be a potential problem for the usability or integrity of the Bitcoin network.

 

A worked example of a Bitcoin Cash price increase

For this rest of this piece, broadly speaking, we assume miners have the objective of maximizing profits in the short term.  In reality miners may also consider other factors or have other objectives, for example, to see their favorite coin succeed, their hated coin fail, or they may try to maximize the long term value of their investment in coins and mining hardware, by focusing on maintaining network stability.

The following scenario applies to an increase in the price of Bitcoin Cash,  similar logic can be used for other price movements:

  1. There is stable equilibrium, where each coin is approximately achieving its 10 minute target time and the hashrate distribution is broadly speaking allocated in proportion to the relative price of each coin.
  2. The price of Bitcoin Cash increases.
  3. Bitcoin Cash then has higher mining profitability than Bitcoin and a significant amount of hashrate moves over to Bitcoin Cash.
  4. Within a day, Bitcoin Cash’s difficulty re-targeting mechanism quickly adjusts, such that the Bitcoin Cash block interval is around 10 minutes.
  5. Due to the higher difficulty on Bitcoin Cash, some of the hashrate moves back over to Bitcoin.  The Bitcoin block interval is longer than 10 minutes, since not all of the hashrate moves back over.
  6. Within around two weeks, Bitcoin’s difficulty re-targeting mechanism adjusts, and Bitcoin’s block interval reaches 10 minutes again.  More hashpower moves back over to Bitcoin, such that the hashrate distribution is approximately in proportion to the new relative price of the two coins, an equilibrium state.

The below table illustrates the above example with actual numbers.

 

Illustration of hashrate oscillation dynamics – Increase in the price of Bitcoin Cash

Initial state Immediately after the price increase After the Bitcoin Cash difficulty adjustment After the Bitcoin difficulty adjustment
Relative prices
Bitcoin 1.0 BTC 1.0 BTC 1.0 BTC 1.0 BTC
Bitcoin Cash 0.2 BTC 0.4 BTC 0.4 BTC 0.4 BTC
Relative mining profitability
Bitcoin 1.00x 1.00x 1.00x 1.17x
Bitcoin Cash 1.00x 2.00x 1.00x 1.17x
Expected hashrate distribution
Bitcoin 83.3% 0.0% 66.7% 71.4%
Bitcoin Cash 16.7% 100.0% 33.3% 28.6%
Expected block interval
Bitcoin 10 minutes n/a 12.5 minutes 10 minutes
Bitcoin Cash 10 minutes 1.7 minutes 10 minutes 10 minutes

Source: BitMEX Research
Notes: The above model is an over simplification and excludes several other stages of hashrate oscillations.  The table assumes hashrate is distributed according the relative price levels of the two coins.  Transaction fee dynamics are excluded.

 

Implications for the Bitcoin network

The above illustrates that the Bitcoin chain could experience block interval swings for longer periods than Bitcoin Cash, due to the longer difficulty adjustment window.  However, the data also shows that even a large fluctuation in the price of Bitcoin Cash, from 0.2 BTC to 0.4 BTC, only increases the expected Bitcoin block interval by 25% to 12.5 minutes, after the Bitcoin Cash difficulty adjusts.

These slower blocks may generate some additional transaction congestion on the Bitcoin chain.  Although, somewhat ironically, this particular problem is likely to be of greater concern to Bitcoin Cash supporters than a Bitcoin supporters.  Many long term Bitcoin holders may not be concerned by periods of 12.5 minute blocks, as they are looking ahead to the long term, while this issue should be resolved within around two weeks.  Although this may be disruptive to users in the medium term, in our view, it is unlikely Bitcoin Cash will maintain such high levels of price volatility for extended periods of time.  Therefore the above problem may not be a serious concern.

However, it is possible that price volatility and therefore hashrate oscillations could remain for extended periods of time.  If this is the case, although Bitcoin may deviate from 10 minute intervals for longer periods, the magnitude of the deviation could be larger for Bitcoin Cash.  This could therefore impact both coins in a negative way.  Should this occur, the eventual Nash equilibrium end game solution could be merged mining, as we discussed in the previous piece.  Although due to the current confrontational political climate, reaching such a solution could take a considerable amount of time and reconciliation.

 

Bitcoin Cash difficulty adjustment schemes designed to cause disruption

There may be some small elements within the Bitcoin Cash community who wish to disrupt the Bitcoin network. For example, some people may have attempted to combine the timing of a rally in the price of Bitcoin Cash with a sharp downward difficulty adjustment caused by the EDA, to drive miners to Bitcoin Cash and disrupt the Bitcoin network.

If the plan is to cause this kind of disruption, one potential idea could be to increase the difficulty adjustment period, for example to a two month window form a one day rolling period.  This would mean that following a sharp price rally of Bitcoin Cash, the difficulty of Bitcoin Cash would take longer to adjust than Bitcoin.  Therefore Bitcoin Cash could remain more profitable than Bitcoin for longer periods, potentially causing disruption and transaction congestion on the Bitcoin network.

However, a long difficulty adjustment window like this may contradict the Bitcoin Cash philosophy. A shorter difficulty adjustment period, larger blocks and lower block times improve usability, which is a key focus of Bitcoin Cash.  In contrast, longer difficulty adjustment periods, smaller blocks and longer block intervals, may improve resilience, which appears to be a key priority for the Bitcoin community.  Therefore Bitcoin Cash is unlikely to adopt such a policy, in our view.

Another issue with this longer two month difficulty adjustment window is that the level of disruption to Bitcoin Cash, relatively speaking, with respect to periods with fewer blocks, will be even larger than for Bitcoin.  Therefore this approach could be considered a lose lose type scenario.  As we expressed above, ultimately, the win win scenario could be something like merged mining.

The Litecoin vs. Dogecoin hash-rate wars of 2014 and implications for Bitcoin vs. Bitcoin Cash

Abstract: In this piece we look at the hash-rate oscillations between Litecoin (LTC) and Dogecoin (DOGE) in 2014. We compare it to the current Bitcoin (BTC) and Bitcoin Cash (BCH) hash-rate oscillations and  consider whether we can learn any lessons from history.

Overview

Although there are many crypto tokens, the number of proof-of-work tokens, with their own set of miners, is surprisingly small — so having two significant proof-of-work tokens that share the same hashing algorithm is quite rare. There appear to be three examples of significant hash-rate oscillations caused by this kind of setup:

Year Coins Hashing algorithm
2014 Litecoin (LTC) vs Dogecoin (DOGE) Scrypt
2016 Ethereum (ETC) vs Ethereum Classic (ETC) EtHash
2017 Bitcoin (BTC) vs Bitcoin Cash (BCH) SHA256

(Source: BitMEX Research)

A comparison of the 2014 Litecoin (LTC) versus Dogecoin (DOGE) hash-rate oscillations with the 2017 Bitcoin (BTC) versus Bitcoin Cash (BCH) oscillations may reveal some lessons.

In early 2014, Dogecoin enjoyed a sudden, meteoric increase in price (figure 1). Its mining incentives increased quickly and this attracted significant hash-rate. The consequences resembled those of Bitcoin Cash’s infamous emergency difficulty adjustment (EDA), which resulted in sharp drops in mining difficulty and made Bitcoin Cash’s mining incentives higher than Bitcoin’s for short periods. Both instances caused sharp swings in the hash rate and network distribution between the respective coins.

We will look back at the 2014 incident with the help of some charts of hash-rate oscillation to see what it has to tell us about the swings in hash rate between Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash, which many are tracking on the fork.lol website.

Mining incentives vs. the difficulty adjustment

The hash-rate distribution between two tokens with the same hashing algorithm should, in theory, be allocated in proportion to the total value of mining incentives on each respective chain. Mining incentives can be thought of as the USD value of both expected block rewards and transaction fees in any given period of time.

Even when token prices, block rewards, and transaction fee levels are temporarily stable, within difficulty adjustment periods further oscillations can occur because miners may switch to more profitable tokens with lower difficulty until the difficulties of the two tokens achieve equilibrium.

Litecoin vs. Dogecoin in 2014

Dogecoin enjoyed a large price rally in early 2014 and then began to challenge Litecoin for the title of the highest hash-rate Scrypt-based token. Litecoin has a two-and-a-half-minute block target time and its difficulty adjusts every three and a half days. Dogecoin has a one-minute target time and at the start of 2014 had a four-hour difficulty adjustment period.

Figure 1: Litecoin (LTC) versus Dogecoin (DOGE) price chart for 2014 (in USD). (Source: Coinmarketcap, BitMEX Research)

The Dogecoin price increased much faster than Litecoin in the early part of 2014 although, as figure 2 shows, Dogecoin never really approached Litecoin’s market capitalisation. Despite its lower market capitalisation, Dogecoin’s higher inflation rate meant that miner rewards were often higher, and a majority of the Scrypt hash rate switched over to Dogecoin during some periods.

Figure 2: Litecoin (LTC) versus Dogecoin (DOGE) market capitalisation in 2014 (in millions of USD). (Source: Coinmarketcap, BitMEX Research)

Dogecoin’s hash rate exceeded Litecoin’s in late January 2014, as figure 3 indicates. The hash rate swung between the coins for roughly a month as miners switched back and forth.

 

Figure 3: Litecoin (LTC) versus Dogecoin (DOGE) hashrate chart – billion hashes per second – 2014. (Source: Litecoin blockchain, Dogecoin blockchain, BitMEX research)

When, in 2017, Bitcoin Cash had higher mining incentives per unit of time than Bitcoin, many miners switched to Bitcoin Cash, repeating the pattern of 2014. As figure 4 shows, miners followed the money back then too.

A key difference is that even after the difficulty found equilibrium, Dogecoin at times offered higher USD value of mining incentives. In 2017, in contrast, Bitcoin Cash’s incentive lead was always only driven by anomalies in the difficulty adjustment algorithm. Bitcoin always had higher incentives per block than Bitcoin Cash. The higher incentives of Bitcoin Cash came per unit time from its faster blocks and as soon as the difficulty returned to equilibrium, Bitcoin regained its position as the highest incentive SHA256 coin.

Figure 4: Litecoin (LTC) versus Dogecoin (DOGE) mining incentive (USD per day) versus hash-rate share in 2014. Transaction fees were not included in the mining-incentive calculation. (Source: Coinmarketcap, Litecoin blockchain, Dogecoin blockchain, Dogecoin Github, BitMEX Research) 

In order to calculate mining incentives for Dogecoin, we had to consider what occurred in 2014, including six changes to the block reward and two hardforks. These changes are outlined in the table of figure 5.

Date Block number Event type Expected block reward Comment
New Old
14 Feb  100,000 Mining-reward change  250,000 500,000 Random reward between 0 and 500,000 DOGE.
17 Mar  145,000 Hardfork 250,000 250,000 Difficulty retargeting period reduced to one minute from four hours. Randomness removed from block reward.
28 April  200,000 Mining-reward change 125,000 250,000
15 July  300,000 Mining-reward change 62,500 125,000
11 Sept  371,337 Hardfork Merged mining with Litecoin enabled.
2 Oct  400,000 Mining-reward change 31,250 62,500
14 Dec  500,000 Mining-reward change 15,625 31,250

Figure 5: Dogecoin (DOGE) 2014 event timeline. (Source: Dogecoin blockchain, Dogecoin Github, BitMEX Research)

As figure 5 indicates, on 17 March 2014, Dogecoin changed the difficulty adjustment algorithm, reducing the target time to just one minute (one block) in order to try and alleviate some of the disruption caused by the hash-rate volatility.

Merged mining

In September 2014, Dogecoin activated its merged-mining hardfork. Merged mining is the process by which work done on one chain can also be considered valid work on another chain. Dogecoin can therefore be thought of as an auxiliary blockchain of Litecoin, in that Dogecoin blocks contain an additional data element pointing to the hash of the Litecoin block header, which is considered as valid proof of work for Dogecoin.

The merged-mining system is considered the ultimate solution to the hash-rate oscillation problem, ensuring stability even in the event of sharp token-price movements.

Implications for Bitcoin Cash

The Bitcoin Cash community is unlikely to want to implement merged mining, perhaps for political reasons, in the medium term. Some in the Bitcoin Cash community see Bitcoin as an adversary chain, rather than one with which it should coexist peacefully. Allowing merged mining can be considered the ultimate peace arrangement between two chains. Initially, some in the Dogecoin community were also unhappy about merged mining, but the community eventually realized that it was the best solution to their hash-rate oscillation problem.

However, Bitcoin Cash has recently fixed the EDA issue, which we highlighted in early September as a potential problem. Perhaps the new one-day rolling difficulty adjustment, combined with better price stability, will solve the hash-rate oscillation problem, such that no more fixes are required. If this doesn’t solve the problem, perhaps alternative difficulty adjustment schemes could be tried before merged mining may slowly makes its way onto the agenda.

交易提示:尝试在Bitfinex上获得免费的比特币现金

摘要:在这篇文章中,我们解释了在合理风险下在Bitfinex平台上通过购买BCC获得免费比特币现金(BCH)的方法。BCC货币代表比特币无限(Bitcoin Unlimited)期货合约的比特币核心(Bitcoin Core)一方。

 

策略概述

正如我们在几周前的文章中所解释的,Bitfinex允许他们的客户交易各种比特币区块链硬分叉货币,但是正如我们所解释的,这些加密货币中在出现的时间上会有重叠。

比特币现金(BCH)是2017年8月推出的其中一个上述加密货币,我们在前面关于这个主题的一篇文章中讨论了这个加密货币。比特币现金的发行发生在比特币无限期货合约期间。因此从理论上讲,那些持有比特币无限合约的比特币核心(Bitcoin Core)一方的投资者,在比特币现金硬分叉的时候,他们的比特币会被锁定在这个合约中。当这个合同在12月结算时,BCC的持有者便可能会收到一些比特币现金。

Bitfinex甚至透过以下声明避回避了这一点:

具有重叠合同期和其他分叉事件的CST可能需要调整以反映正确的价格。我们知道,明天的事件发生之后,BCC / BCU CST需要追溯调整以反映BCH和BTG的价格。同样的,BT1 / BT2可能需要调整,以反映任何锁定了BTC的BTG价格。我们有这方面的计划,却可能无法马上实施,但这对我们的用户是公平的,并将以非侵入方式赋予其应用追溯性。更多细节将在下周开始实行。

资料来源:Bitfinex

 

投资建议

由于最近Bitcoin Cash的价格上涨,目前它的交易价格约为0.35 BTC,我们认为,在Bitfinex投资BCC可能是一个好主意,试图获得一些比特币现金的投资收益敞口,而无需支付及持有它。

有两种方法可以实现这一点:

  1. 在市场上购买BCC。目前BCC的价格大约为0.96BTC,理论上价格可能会上涨,并且会比BTC高出一些。
  2. 将BTC存入Bitfinex,然后等其分叉成BCU和BCC。然后可以将BCC持有到结算日,并获得免费的BCH。

这种交易有一些风险,正如我们在下面的部分中所解释的那样。不过,近期BCH价格反弹,我们认为风险/回报平衡略为乐观。

 

投资风险

  • 分配系数 – 虽然比特币无限期期货合约是在BCH之前出现的,但是加密货币的分割是可以发生在BCH的出现前和出现后的。因此可能没有足够的BCH储备来分配给所有BCC代币持有人。这可能需要分配系数来调整。事实上,一些市场参与者可能会创建新的BCC,以便从本文提到的交易理念中受益,这将使分配系数不利于BCC的投资者。
  • 比特币现金价格 – 比特币无限期合约结算日期前,BCH的市场价值可能大幅下调。
  • Bitfinex政策 –  Bitfinex在这方面的政策是不确定的,可能会改变。
  • 交易对手风险 –  Bitfinex在比特币无限合约结算日期之前破产的风险。

 

欢迎转载,请注明文章来自

BitMEX (www.bitmex.com)

Trading Tip: Attempt to obtain free Bitcoin Cash on Bitfinex

Abstract: In this piece we explain a reasonably risky way to obtain free Bitcoin Cash (BCH) on the Bitfinex platform, by purchasing the BCC token.  This BCC token represents the Bitcoin Core side of the Bitcoin Unlimited futures contract.

 

Strategy overview

As we explained in our piece a few weeks ago, Bitfinex allow their customers to trade various Bitcoin chain split tokens, however as we explained some of these tokens have overlapping periods.

One of these tokens, Bitcoin Cash (BCH), launched in August 2017, we discussed this token in our earlier piece on the subject.  The launch of Bitcoin Cash occurred during the Bitcoin Unlimited futures contract period.  Therefore in theory, those who held BCC (the “Bitcoin Core” side of the Bitcoin Unlimited contract), had their Bitcoins locked up in this contract at the time of the Bitcoin Cash hardfork.  When this contract settles in December, holders of BCC may receive some Bitcoin Cash.

Bitfinex even eluded to this with the following statement:

CSTs with overlapping contract periods and other forking events may need to be adjusted to reflect the correct economics. We are aware the the BCC/BCU CSTs need retroactive adjustments to reflect BCH, as well as BTG, after the event tomorrow. Similarly, BT1/BT2 may need to be adjusted to reflect any BTG that accrues to the locked up BTC. We have a plan for this and may not be able to implement it immediately, but it is fair to our users and will be applied retroactively in a non-intrusive way. More details will follow on this next week.

Source: Bitfinex

 

Investment recommendation

Due to the recent price rally in Bitcoin Cash, with it currently trading at around 0.35 BTC, in our view, it may be a good idea to invest in the BCC token on Bitfinex, to try to obtain some exposure to Bitcoin Cash, without paying for it.

There are two ways of achieving this:

  1. Buy BCC in the market.  The current price of BCC is around 0.96 BTC and in theory the price could increase and trade at 1.0 (Or in theory BCC could even trade at a premium to BTC, although new units can be created if this occurs).
  2. Deposit BTC into Bitfinex and then split it into BCU and BCC.  Then one could hold the BCC to the settlement date and hopefully obtain the free BCH.

There are some risks to this trade, as we explain in the section below.  However, with the recent rally in the BCH price, in our view, the risk/reward balance is somewhat favorable.

 

Investment risks

  • Distribution coefficient – Although the Bitcoin Unlimited futures contract launched prior to BCH, the split tokens could be created both prior to and after the launch of BCH.  Therefore there may not be sufficient BCH in reserve to allocate to all BCC token holders.  A distribution coefficient may be required in order to adjust for this.  Actually some market participants may create new BCC in order to benefit from the trading idea mentioned in this piece, which would make any distribution coefficient less favorable to BCC investors.
  • Bitcoin Cash price – The market value of BCH could fall substantially prior to the Bitcoin Unlimited contract settlement date.
  • Bitfinex Policy – Bitfinex policy with respect to this matter is uncertain and could change.
  • Counterparty risk – The risk that Bitfinex becomes insolvent prior to the Bitcoin Unlimited contract settlement date.

 

SegWit2x(B2X)硬分叉 – 保护您和您的加密货币,第二部分:投资策略

摘要:即将推出的 SegWit2x 硬分叉很可能导致价格波动。在本文我们将探讨一些您可以利用及获利的潜在投资策略。

 

策略一:守株待兔

分拆后最受欢迎的投资策略很可能是不采取任何行动,并继续持有 BTC 和 B2X 。这可能是最谨慎的做法,因为无论哪个加密货币变得更有价值,您的资产都可以受到保护。大多数人可能因为懒惰而不是自己选择采取这种策略。但是,即使这是您的首选投资策略,无论如何也可以先尝试拆分您的加密货币。增加您的投资策略的灵活性,并在需要交易时保护您的资金。

 

策略二:投资您喜爱的加密货币

许多投资者可能出于意识形态的原因支持 BTC 或 B2X 加密货币,或者因为他们觉得自己选择的加密货币具有最好的货币特性。

  • BTC 的支持者通常更喜欢其强而有力的共识规则,因为他们认为这使比特币具有更好或更独特的货币特征。而且他们通常重视当前开发团队谨慎细致的做法。 BTC 支持者可能希望灵活性和创新性来自共识规则层面以外的其他层面。
  • 与此相反,B2X 支持者可能会更重视其灵活的共识规则,以确保系统具有动态性,能够更快地迎合用户需求。 B2X 支持者通常重视系统对于用户体验的货币特征。通常,他们不太区分在共识层面的变化和系统其他层面的变化。

如果您对上述某一个愿景更加认同,那么投资符合您认可的加密货币是一个好主意。如果您的愿景是正确的,这不仅可以帮助您获得更大的回报,也可以帮助确保您的青睐的加密货币成为 “赢家” ,因为它有助于提高该加密货币的价值。

或者,您可能不在乎哪个愿景 “获胜” ,但想要支持赢的一方。在这种情况下,重要的不仅是评估双方的意见,且要观察双方辩论的信念程度。稍微偏向其中一个愿景,但同时对冲他们的投注的投资者,可能比一个忠诚的愿景支持者的影响力更小,因为他会愿意把所有的加密货币都投入到硬分叉的其中一边。这个因素可能对 BTC 更有利,因为许多忠诚的 “大区块支持者” 可能已经卖掉了一些 BTC 来投资于比特币现金。

硬分叉后最常见的投资策略可能是不采取任何行动。但是,在采取行动的那些少数人中,大部分是 B2X 卖家。这是因为 8 月份采取行动支持大区块的那些少数人所持有的比特币现金将不会被分配 BTC 或 B2X 。相比之下,8 月份迅速出售比特币现金的少数人将在今年 11 月分配 BTC 和 B2X 。然而,这些仍是高度投机的事件,没有人知道将会发生什么。

 

策略三:投资便宜的 / “差” 的加密货币 – 乔尔 · 格林布莱特( Joel Greenblatt )策略

在我们最喜欢的投资书籍之一,乔尔 · 格林布莱特( Joel Greenblatt )的 “您可以成为一个股市天才”(书名一般,但内容很棒)中,对投资最好的建议是,如果发生股票拆分,就应该购买您没那么喜欢的公司,也就是被分拆的公司。在这种情况下,B2X 是分拆出来的加密货币。乔尔 · 格林布莱特的 “哥谭资本”( Gotham Capital )从 1985 年到 1994 年实现了 50% 的年化投资回报率。这一时期基金的核心战略之一是投资 “差” 的分拆公司。正如格林布莱特所解释的那样:

为什么一家公司会选择出售或以其他方式将业务从公司中剥离出去,这是有很多原因的。当他们这样做的时候,真的要注意了:因为您可以在分拆投资上赚一笔。事实是摆在眼前的。分拆公司的股票,甚至是分拆公司的母公司股票,均大大超越市场平均增长水平。在宾夕法尼亚州完成的一项研究涵盖了二十五年并截至于1988年的数据显示,在分拆公司成为独立公司后的前三年,其股票表现好于同业及标准普尔500指数约10%。

格林布莱特提到,分拆往往是由于想要 “剥离出一个糟糕的企业,以便一个好的企业可以不受约束的展示给投资者” 。差的公司或分拆公司一般是由投资者出售的,分拆时差的公司的负面叙述造成市场的负面情绪。正如格林布莱特所解释的那样:

分拆过程本身是一种将股票分配给错误的人的低效做法。一般而言,新的分拆股票不会在市场出售,而是分配给股东,这些股东大部分投资于母公司的业务。因此,一旦将分拆的股份分配给母公司的股东,一般他们不考虑基本价值而立即将其出售。最初的超额供给对分拆股票的价格有着可预测的影响:通常情况下对价格的影响是低迷的。据说精明的机构投资者也参与了销售。大多数分拆公司比母公司要小得多。分拆公司可能只有母公司规模的 10% 或 20% 。即使养老基金或共同基金花时间分析这些分拆公司,这些公司的规模往往对于机构投资者来说还是太小。

格林布莱特继续引用了四篇分拆案例研究,万豪酒店 / 万豪国际,策略安防 / 百力通,美国运通 / 雷曼兄弟和西尔斯 / 添惠公司。

在许多方面,比特币分拆的产品如 B2X 和股票衍生产品可能会带来一些相似的投资机会。也许 B2X 正在分发给 “错误的人” 。比特币投资者通常更看重稳健的规则和由此产生的高度弹性的货币特性。也许一些看重灵活性和用户体验等其他特征的比特币投资者已经投资了以太坊或比特币现金,因此剩下的投资者可能会 “放弃” B2X。 B2X 支持者的风险是他们将新加密货币分配给了 “错误的人” ,使价格变得 “低迷” 。不过,这可能会给反向投资者们提供一个机会。

B2X 的价格可能会跌到很低的水平,而因为有些人可能会把加密货币卖掉而造成该市场负面情绪。这对反向投资 B2X 来说是个好时机。这种投资理念似乎违背了 “网络效应为王” 或 “最多工作量的区块链为赢家” 的比特币社区中的共同的观念,意味着少数人使用的区块链的前景有限。但是,这个观点可能没什么投资基础。

然而,格林布莱特的分拆理论究竟是否真的适用于像 B2X 这样的比特币分拆出来的产品,目前还不清楚。格林布莱特仍然会对较差的分拆公司进行基本面分析,能否把这种方法应用于比特币或其分拆产品仍是一个未知数。相比下风险当然更高。尽管在我看来,在硬分叉之后,如果 B2X 的交易价格是比特币价格的 5% 或更低,并且市场都认为 B2X 已经死了的话,那么这个 “差” 加密货币可能只值一小笔钱。


策略四:利用不同交易所的政策差异

在比特币现金分叉期间,不同的交易平台有不同的政策。比如 BitMEX 基本上忽略了比特币现金,而期货价格仅与比特币挂钩。但是,Kraken 是支持比特币现金的,这样那些在比特币上拥有多头仓位的人也可以获得比特币现金。如果您是在硬分叉的时候做空比特币的话,那么您会同时自动持有做空比特币现金的仓位。交易所之间的政策差异提供了交易不对称性,这在理论上是可以用来赚钱的。

比如在比特币现金硬分叉期间,一个有趣的策略是在 Kraken 建立一个 1 BTC 的保证金多头仓位,然后在BitMEX 上建立 1 BTC 的保证金空头仓位进行对冲。以此方法操作,在硬分叉之后,您会在 Kraken 上收到一个 Bitcoin Cash 加密货币,这基本上是白白得到的,因为在您BitMEX上没有相应的比特币现金偿还义务。

就即将出现的硬分叉而言,当尝试从事这种套利交易时,需要考虑四种相关的潜在交易政策。

 

有关 B2X 分拆加密货币的潜在平台交易政策

 

 

政策 A 政策 B 政策 C 政策 D
将用户比特币存款余额拆分成 BTC 和 B2X    
将用户比特币保证金多头仓位拆分成 BTC 和 B2X 仓位        
将用户比特币保证金空头仓位拆分成 BTC 和 B2X 空头仓位        
比特币贷款人应收取 BTC 和 B2X        
比特币借款人应偿还 BTC 和 B2X        

注解:在比特币借贷和比特币保证金仓位方面也可能有不同的政策,上图未说明。

在 B2X 分拆之前进行的一个有趣的投资策略可能是在实行政策 C 和 D 的交易平台上建立多头比特币仓位,并在实行政策 A,B 和 C 交易平台上建立比特币空头仓位。理论上,这可以使您免费获得 B2X 加密货币。

有些人可能会认为政策 C 似乎是一个不太合适的选择,因为它会导致交易不对称性。不过有些交易所在比特币现金方面的确有类似的政策。这样做的理由是,持有比特币空头仓位的客户进入市场和购买比特币现金的负担太高,特别是比特币现金的流动性较低的情况下。

随着 B2X 硬分叉的到来,我们可以写一篇文来总结主要交易所的政策,以及如何根据这些政策来拟定交易策略。虽然如果等到都市场都了解清楚后,可能已经为时已晚,价差已经被拉开了,市场机会也已经反映在价格上了。在 Bitfinex 上,B2X 的交易价格已经超过 1,000 美元,因此可以通过这些策略来赚钱。如果您真的喜欢冒险这也许是一个好主意,您可以先研究交易所就比特币现金政策,以了解他们就B2X的潜在政策,然后在政策正式公布前建立您的交易仓位。

 

 

 

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SegWit2x(B2X)硬分叉 – 保护您和您的加密货币,第一部分:加密货币分拆

摘要:即将推出的 SegWit2x 硬分叉缺乏交易重放保护。在本文中,我们将探讨您可以如何保护自己,通过分析各种您可以考虑的加密货币分拆方案。

 

概述

SegWit2x(B2X)是一个将比特币现有容量限制提升一倍的提案。这将使最大区块容量由4MB增加到8MB。

本次更新与比特币目前的规则共识不兼容(被称为硬分叉),这意味着它可能会导致一个新的加密货币产生,使得比特币持有人将在硬分叉后将同时得到比特币(BTC)及 SegWit2x 加密货币(B2X)。在许多层面,这与最近发生的比特币现金硬分叉(也是将区块大小容量增加到 8MB )类似。一个明显的区别是,其不同于比特币现金,B2X 没有有效的交易重放保护。因此,许多用户可能会失去资金,另一方面,那些成功保护资金的用户可能会获得正面的投资回报。

预计硬分叉将于 2017 年 11 月 18 日星期六左右发生。(第 494,784 个区块)

 

为什么要分叉?

SegWit2x分拆后将产生两个加密货币,现有的比特币(BTC)和一个新的 “分拆” 加密货币SegWit2x(B2X)。这很可能导致大幅的价格波动,这也可能带来投资机会。由于缺乏交易重放保护,无论您对形势或投资策略的看法如何,尽快分拆您的加密货币以确保交易灵活性及保护您的加密货币的做法是明智的。许多用户可能打算在交易中只发送两个加密货币中的其中一个,但不小心的把两个加密货币都发送出去,这将导致不可挽回的资金损失。如果您不尽快分拆您的加密货币,您可能是其中一个蒙受损失的用户。

不幸的是,缺乏强有力的交易重放保护也可能为骗子/攻击者提供机会。例如诈骗分子可以在交易所不断的反复存入及提取资金,希望找到任何弱点。如果任何交易所没有实行交易重放保护,攻击者很可能会迅速利用这一点,从而导致交易所破产。除此之外,个人用户可能成为骗子的目标。诈骗者可以在知道受害者的钱包上的收款链接是错误的情况下出售比特币给受害者,或骗子可以从受害者那里获得比特币,受害者可能会把这两条链接上的加密货币都发送给买方。

这种潜在损失和攻击的机会会对整个生态圈的声誉造成损害,因此在没有强大的交易重放保护的情况下进行一个有争议的硬分叉是一个具有潜在负面后果的高风险事件。当然,您依然可以采取某些行动来保护自己。

 

分拆您的加密货币

当硬分叉发生时,您的比特币将同时存在于 BTC 和 B2X 两个区块链中的相同输出链上。由于 B2X 硬分叉不包含默认启用的交易重放保护功能,当您在任一区块链上支出您的加密货币时,该交易有可能在另一个区块链上重复该支出动作。因此谨慎的做法是分拆您的硬币,这样您的 BTC 和 B2X 就能存在于每个区块链上的不同输出链上,这意味着您的交易不能再被重复。

不幸的是,这不是一个简单的过程,许多人不太可能做得到这一点。硬分叉之前您不能分拆您的加密货币,但是谨慎的策略可能是预先准备好如何分拆加密货币,例如在硬分叉出现之前将加密货币转移到另一个钱包。对于许多用户来说,也许不太容易,但是如果您的行动速度够快,能够在别人有机会出售分拆加密货币之前出售它们,您就能够获得投资回报。

 

应该使用哪些钱包

为了拆分您的硬币,您需要手动构建自己的交易或使用两个钱包,一个用于 BTC ,一个用于 B2X ,因为大多数钱包不允许您进行两个相冲突的交易。您将需要两个分开的钱包,以接收分拆后的两个加密货币。

不幸的是,以保护您的加密货币,您需要两个完整的节点钱包,例如用 Bitcoin Core 支持 BTC,用 BTC1 支持 B2X 。一个完整的节点钱包意味着它能验证整个区块链上的所有规则共识。您可能需要两个完全验证的节点,因为:

  • 在 BTC 方面,您可能需要一个执行 400 万单位容量限制( B2X 计划突破)的钱包;
  • 在 B2X 方面,您需要一个执行加密货币保护规则的钱包,该规则要求第一个 B2X 区块中的非见证数据大于 1MB 。

您需要确保每个钱包能执行这些规则中的其中一个,以确保您的钱包不会遵循与您的加密货币存放地方不同的区块链。否则您的加密货币可能会从您的钱包中消失。

为了谨慎地为硬分叉做好准备,在个别的计算机上运行每个客户端的完整节点是个好主意。同步过程可能需要几天的时间,因此也许应该开始在硬分叉之前运行节点,您会想要做好分拆您的加密货币的准备,并尽快将它们消费掉。

 

分拆的方法

方法一:试错法

最基本的拆分方法是运行 BTC 客户端和 B2X 客户端,导入私钥,然后尝试将自己的加密货币发送给每个区块链上的两个不同输出链。可能双方交易都获得确认,在这种情况下,您便成功了,或两个区块链上发生了同样的交易,您则需要再试一次。

这种方法的麻烦在于,在时间和金钱方面它都是很昂贵的。很多人可能会尝试这种方法,因此会造成网络拥挤,而失败的次数越多,需要付的费用越高。除此之外,两条区块链中至少有一条保证有少量的算力,这可能会在短期内增加区块间隔,导致更多的交易拥堵,而您需要等待拆分双方交易确认来确保您得资金已经受到保护。

不幸的是,B2X 的问题,不仅是因为这个硬分叉没有实行强大的交易重放保护,使得 BTC 在 B2X 的交易和 B2X 在 BTC 的交易上都是有效的,然而 B2X 也使用着和 BTC 一样的网络魔法。因此,在默认情况下,您的 B2X 钱包会将其交易广播至 BTC 网络,从而使交易重放可能发生。

 

方法二:锁定时间

锁定时间是一个交易场,它确保交易只在某个区块高度之后才会有效。默认情况下,某些钱包(包括 Bitcoin Core )会将当前区块高度添加到其交易的锁定时间里。这种交易类型的动机有几个,其中之一就是为了减少矿工为了孤立当前领先地区块所得到的激励,避免矿工通过提高最后一个已经确认且在内存池中的区块的交易费用来获得更多的费用收入。预计当未来区块奖励较低时,这将成为一个潜在的问题。

可以尝试使用此功能分叉 BTC 和 B2X 。例如,如果 BTC 区块链比 B2X 区块链多 5 个区块,则可以用当前区块高度发送一个 BTC 交易作为锁定时间,因此对于接下来的 5 个区块来说,这个交易在 B2X 上将是无效的。如果交易在 BTC 上确认的话,您则可以在 5 个区块周期结束之前,在 B2X 网络上发送另一个支出金额相同的另一笔交易。在 B2X 具有较高区块高度的情况下,可以做出反向操作。

这种方法听起来很复杂,涉及到两条区块链的管理。然而,在使用 Bitcoin Core 钱包时,这操作会默认设置,并可以与上述的试错方法相结合。从理论上讲,您所要做的就是查看哪个区块链正处于领先位置,然后在有较高区块高度的区块链上进行交易。

 

方法三:选择 “官方” 的交易重放保护

B2X 区块链正在考虑在重放保护中添加选项。这基本上意味着 B2X 客户端定义了现有有效交易的一个子集,然后在 B2X 区块链上禁止这些交易。因此,您可以在 BTC 网络上以这种格式发送交易,且该交易在 B2X 上无效,从而实现成功分叉。

然而,这在技术上是具有挑战性的,因为不清楚是否有任何比特币钱包支持此功能,并且钱包的设计上可能没有足够的时间来为普通用户实现这一点。除此之外,还不知道在交易重放保护 B2X 中将使用什么类型的选项,或者该功能是否将启用。官方的 B2X 客户端似乎已经经历了以下复述:

  • 最初没有交易重放保护的选项
  • 使用 OP_Return 的交易重放保护方法被合并到代码库中
  • 一个新的交易重放保护方法,禁止输出交易到特定 P2SH 地址的方案被提出
  • 最新的方案出现了问题,这显然会导致资金的损失。因此几天前,这个交易重放保护的选择已经从 B2X 客户端中删除

所以目前还不清楚 B2X 的交易重放保护选项是什么,有可能根本就没有任何选项。


方法四:在已经分拆的加密货币上做记号

其他人可能已经成功地能够分拆他们的加密货币。然后他们可以从他们分拆出来的加密货币给您发送一个输出信号。然后,您可以将此输出信号用作新交易的输入信号。由于此输入仅存在于一个区块链上,因此您的交易在另一个区块链上将无效。理想情况下,这是分拆后开采区块的加密货币奖励,这样,您可以确保您的交易只能发生在分拆的一侧,而不管任何潜在的重组情况。

这个过程似乎比上述方法都来的容易,但是您必须确保您的加密货币正确的存放在您的钱包中,以确保您在所需的交易输入信号中交易。这种方法需要等待别人,因此如果您想尽快分拆手中的加密货币的话这的方案可能比较慢,这会是一个问题。

 

方法五:让交易所帮您

您可以将您的加密货币发送到支持 BTC 和 B2X 的交易所,然后交易所可以为您处理分拆。您需要检查交易所的政策是否只处理在硬分叉节点前收到的加密货币,或者也处理在硬分叉之后收到的加密货币。

这项政策的一个缺点是您需要承担交易对手风险,您可能不想您的长期储蓄承担这种风险。在高风险,高成交量的时期,如区块链分叉,且没有强大的交易重放保护的情况下,这样的风险可能是个问题,这会给交易所带来运营上的挑战。这种方法也不符合比特币社区中的共识,您的私钥应该在您的控制之下,尤其是在硬分叉这种敏感时期。

虽然在硬分叉之前把加密货币送到交易所的好处是,您可能能够很快地交易这两个加密货币,甚至可能比上述那些分拆方法更快。这可以为您带来更好的投资机会。

 

结论

也许最好的策略是结合上述方法。在检查了交易所的政策之后,您可以在硬分叉之前将一些加密货币发送到您选择的交易所,然后剩余的加密货币可以尝试使用上面解释的方法二进行分拆。

然而,尽管有上述建议,但绝大多数比特币持有者很可能不会为分拆做准备。因此,如果您做了以上任何一项,比起大多数人您已经赢在起跑线上,这可能会带来一些经济上的回报,或者至少可以帮助您避免损失。

 

 

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BitMEX (www.bitmex.com)

交易平台Bitfinex区块链硬分叉货币

摘要:在这篇文章中,我们将看看2017年Bitfinex平台上可能发生的十个不同的区块链分叉货币,以及面临的复杂挑战。在某些情况下,Bitfinex的政策决策是不公平的,令客户造成一定的负担,但这也是无法避免的。

 

区块链分叉货币概述

Bitfinex区块链分叉货币 – 2017

资料来源:Bitfinex,BitMEX研究

注:仍不知道Bitcoin Unlimited区块链在2017年12月合同到期结算时会不会以一个和比特币不同的区块链形式存在

 

上图显示了在2017年Bitfinex平台上可能发生的十个区块链分叉货币。在此期间,不同的组织团体实行比特币分拆,Bitfinex为其客户提供交易这些分拆后的加密货币的机会。通常每个分拆可以产生三个新的货币。例如SegWit2x导致了:

  • BT1 – 分叉后可以兑换BTC的期货合约货币
  • BT2 – 分叉后可以兑换B2X的期货合约货币
  • B2X – SegWit2x货币本身

正如我们在下面解释的那样,允许所有这些分叉货币交易导致Bitfinex的操作出现问题,这给Bitfinex客户带来了一定的负担,并在有些情况下造成对客户“不太公平”的结果。然而,考虑其复杂性,完全避免这些问题是困难的,也是不太现实的。在许多方面,Bitfinex在迎接这些挑战并支持分叉货币的同时,对加密货币社区做了许多贡献。虽然在某些方面,其行为可能对客户不公平,又或者平台可以更好地处理情况。

下表列出了与十个区块链分叉货币相关事件的完整时间表。

 

2017年Bitfinex区块链分叉货币时间表

日期 事件 分叉自 分叉后 保证金多头收取分叉货币 保证金空头亏欠分叉货币 比特币贷款方收取分叉货币* 比特币借款方亏钱分叉货币*
 18/03/2017 可选择分叉 BTC BCC + BCU n/a n/a n/a n/a
 01/08/2017* 直接分发 BTC BCH  
 06/10/2017 可选择分叉 BTC BT1 + BT2 n/a n/a n/a n/a
 23/10/2017 可选择分叉 BTC BG1 + BG2 n/a n/a n/a n/a
 24/10/2017 换取 BG1 BTC n/a n/a n/a n/a
 24/10/2017 换取 BG2 BTG n/a n/a n/a n/a
 24/10/2017 直接分发 BTC BTG  
 27/10/2017 购回 BTG BTC n/a n/a n/a n/a
 16/11/2017* 换取 BT1 BTC n/a n/a n/a n/a
 16/11/2017* 换取 BT2 B2X n/a n/a n/a n/a
 16/11/2017* 直接分发 BTC B2X
 XX/12/2017* 直接分发 BTC BTU  ?  ?  ?  ?
 31/12/2017 换取 BCC BTC n/a n/a n/a n/a
 31/12/2017 换取 BCU BTU n/a n/a n/a n/a

资料来源:Bitfinex,BitMEX研究

注:

  • BCH对应的贷款方系数为0.85
  • 16/11/2017是SegWit2x预计硬分叉日期
  • Bitcoin Unlimited 硬分叉的日期无法预计,因为Bitcoin Unlimited本身与BTC的区别太小,是否发生分叉很难定义,它也很可能不会发生
  • BTG和B2X直接分发时,只有当BTC“用作融资抵押品”时,贷款方才收到分叉货币
  • 对于上表中的任何不准确之处,我们深表歉意

 

保证金仓位和融资

正如我们在先前SegWit2x硬分叉文中提到的一样,平台对于加密货币分拆后分发的决策不是那么简单直接的。基本上它们有四种选择:

 

金融平台关于分配分拆加密货币的政策方案

 方案一 方案二 方案三 方案四
分拆用户存入比特币 & 分拆
分拆用户持有比特币保证金买入仓位 & 分拆买入仓位
分拆用户持有比特币保证金卖空仓位 & 分拆卖空仓位    
贷比特币方获得比特币 & 分拆
借比特币方欠比特币 & 分拆  

注:上图有可能不包括所有对于比特币融资和比特币保证金仓位的政策。


BitMEX可能会选择方案一(或在某些情况下可能选择方案二),但是Bitfinex通常会选择方案(或方案的变体)三或四。虽然Bitfinex的政策方案在许多方面被认为是“更公平的”,但可能会导致一些问题。支持额外的加密货币不仅可能为交易平台带来额外的负担,也可能为客户带来额外的负担,像 Bitcoin Gold如下所示。

 

比特币黄金(BTG) – 强制回购

Bitfinex客户若在硬分叉发生时,使用杠杆卖空BTC,那该仓位在硬分叉后就产生了需要偿还BTG债务的责任。这一点的作用在于平衡用户在硬分叉发生时利用杠杆买入BTC后会得到BTG的仓位。

这对于卖空的客户造成了负担,因为他们现在必须进入市场并购买BTG才能覆盖他们的仓位,尽管他们对BTG没有兴趣或不太熟悉。这可能会使某些客户感到沮丧,因为在这种特殊情况下并没有提前收到通知(可能不到24小时内)。由于保证金交易在BTG上不一定会启用,客户仅得到三天的时间来覆盖他们的BTG债务,或者Bitfinex会用他们抵押BTC在市场上购买BTG来覆盖其BTG债务。

 

任何人在分叉时作为BTC借款方而造成的负余额的都需要在3天之内回购BTG,否则就会冒着系统帮他们自动回购BTG的风险

资料来源:Bitfinex

 

Bitfinex客户可能特别关心此问题,因为到时候BTG加密货币可能仍未存在,客户也不准备卖出,BTG也可能需要进一步的开发工作。Bitfinex允许交易的日期是10月24日,这只是记录比特币的数量及持有账户的“拍照日”,而不是具体发出BTG的日期。因此,在“拍照日”卖空BTC的Bitfinex客户将无法将BTG存入平台以覆盖其空头头寸,因为该加密货币尚不存在,然而他们被迫在Bitfinex的平台买入BTG。BTG的流动性可能不足,这可能会导致问题。

 

虽然这“不太公平”,也可能会另一些客户沮丧,但批评他们容易,毕竟十全十美的政策方案是不存在的。

 

区块链分叉的加密货币是不会考虑其对其他区块链分叉的加密货币的影响的

上述约定并不能完美的相互对应。例如,8月份BTC的持有人获得分配了BCH。但是,BCC的持有人从未收到BCH。上述图表中合同的重叠性质说明了这个问题。

如果Bitfinex想要进一步增加上述的复杂性,可以进行以下额外分配方案:

  • 当SegWit2x硬分叉发生时,将BTG分配给BT1的持有人
  • 2017年12月31日,Bitcoin Unlimited合同结算日期,向BCC持有人分配BCH,BTG和B2X

Bitfinex实际上可能会对这些事件进行调整,甚至在最近的帖子中回避讨论这种方案的可能性。看看他们的客户是否会要求上述方案是很有趣的。

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Non Empty Smaller Block Data By Mining Pool

Abstract: In this piece we present data displaying the proportion of smaller blocks produced by the different mining pools, over time.  This follows on from our piece last week looking at empty blocks.

 

Smaller blocks overview

Following on from our analysis on empty blocks last week, some readers asked for a similar analysis to be conducted for non empty but smaller blocks, by mining pool.  For your consideration, we present some data trying to capture the proportion of smaller blocks by mining pool.  We are not unable to draw any interesting conclusions from this analysis.

 

Charts illustrating the proportion of smaller blocks by mining pool

 

Figure 1 – Blocksize bucket analysis by mining pool (in bytes) – 2017

Source: Bitcoin Blockchain, BitMEX Research, Blockchain.info (For mining pool name)
Notes:  Data up to 22nd October 2017. Mining pool with less than 800 blocks in the period is excluded

 

Figure 2 – Blocksize bucket analysis by mining pool (in bytes) – 2016

Source: Bitcoin Blockchain, BitMEX Research, Blockchain.info (For mining pool name)
Notes:  Mining pool with less than 800 blocks in the period is excluded

 

Figure 3 – Blocksize bucket analysis by mining pool (in bytes) – 2015

Source: Bitcoin Blockchain, BitMEX Research, Blockchain.info (For mining pool name)
Notes:  Mining pool with less than 800 blocks in the period is excluded.  BTCC Pool had many blocks with 2 transactions in this period

 

Figure 4 – Percentage of non empty blocks smaller than 10,000 bytes by mining pool – monthly

Source: Bitcoin Blockchain, BitMEX Research, Blockchain.info (For mining pool name)
Notes:  Mining pool with less than 250 blocks in the the month is excluded

 

Methodology

We chose 10 blocksize buckets:

  1. Less than 500 bytes
  2. 500 bytes to 5,000 bytes
  3. 5,000 bytes to 10,000 bytes
  4. 10,000 bytes to 25,000 bytes
  5. 25,000 bytes to 50,000 bytes
  6. 50,000 bytes to 75,000 bytes
  7. 75,000 bytes to 100,000 bytes
  8. 100,000 bytes to 250,000 bytes
  9. 250,000 bytes to 500,000 bytes
  10. 500,000 bytes to 1,000,000 bytes

The selection of the bucket boundaries was entirely arbitrary and therefore this could weaken the analysis.  Figure 1 appears to indicate that the 10,000 byte bucket may be most significant, due to the apparent spike for some miners in 2017.  Therefore non empty blocks less than 10,000 bytes were chosen as the range for the monthly chart, which is shown in figure 4.

 

Concluding remarks

As a reminder we do not believe any of the above data is strong evidence for covert ASICBOOST.  Others have argued that smaller or empty blocks by some mining pools could be considered as circumstantial evidence for covert ASICBOOST, without always providing data backing up these claims.  Our objective here was simply to produce charts illustrating the prevalence of these smaller blocks by mining pool.

比特币经济学 – 信贷扩张和货币特征(第二部分)

摘要:在本文中,我们探讨比特币和传统形式的货币相比有什么独特的特征。我们分析些特征可能对银行信贷扩张能力的影响。

 

不同类型货币的主要特点

尽管本文第一部分提到的银行存款的强大优势,即电子汇款的能力,然而实体现金和电子货币相比还是有一些显着的好处。下表总结了不同类型货币,包括银行存款,实体现金和电子货币(比特币)的主要特点。

 

银行存款,实体现金和电子现金的特点

特性 银行存款 实体现金 电子货币
实体现金的优势
如果银行破产或无法接触,资金将得到充分保护*
政府机构没收资金的难度较大
可以有效的隐藏资金避开有关当局
汇款不容易被阻止
收汇款方可以保持高度的匿名性
汇款后是不可撤销的
可以做到即时汇款 ? ?
汇款没有限定时间 ?
汇款费用为零 ?
在停电和通讯失灵的情况下仍然可以交易
钱在没有特定设备的情况下依然可以使用
任何人都可以使用交易支付系统,无需许可
电子系统的优势
汇款可以透过互联网转账
没有收取和计算零钱的问题
交易可以被轻松记录
资金可以很容易地被保护,防止盗窃 ?

注:*由于实体现金由中央银行发出,所以受其政策影响导致在流动性方面仍存在潜在问题

 

根据上表,实体现金将始终保有它那部分优势。但是,总的来说,对大多数用户而言银行存款还是优于实体现金。以电子方式汇出或收取银行存款的功能依然吸引着用户,特别是在数字时代。正如我们在第一部分中所解释的那样,正是因为这些钱可以用电子方式操控,所以银行存款的需求总是很高,使银行能够无所忌惮的扩大信贷规模。

 

比特币的独特性质

与银行存款相比,比特币和实体现金有许多共同的优点。虽然比特币没有全部实体现金全部的优势,如上表所示。但比特币的主要特色是它同时具有实体现金的部分优势和电子操作的功能。

 

比特币旨在以电子形式复制实体现金的一些特性,即 电子现金系统。在比特币之前,人们只能在实体现金和银行存款之间进行二选一的抉择。

 

虽然以技术特性来说实体现金也是银行存款的一种形态,它属于中央银行的存款,而实体现金仍具有独特的票据属性,不能被电子形式的货币复制。比特币在2009年首次提供了以电子方式转让票据类型资产的能力。下面的简单表格展示了比特币和其它基于区块链技术货币的重要特性。

 

传统金融和比特币提供的选择

票据工具 电子工具
实体现金 (钞票和硬币)
电子货币(银行存款)
电子现金  (比特币)


因此,比特币可以被认为是一种新的混合形式的货币,具有实体现金的一些优势,也具有银行存款的一些优势。

 

比特币的局限性

虽然比特币继承了传统电子货币和实体现金的部分优势,比特币不具有电子货币或实体现金的所有优点,但是它具有独特的定位能够成为上述二者优势特征的子集。这无疑提供了一个新的中间选项。


例如,比特币可能永远达不到传统电子支付系统的交易量或者能像实体现金一样在没有电力的情况下依然可以交易转账。随着技术的进步,比特币可能会慢慢发展出更多的优势,逐步提高功能性,缩小差距。

 

这些特性对信贷扩张的影响

了解这些特征后,我们可以评估比特币生态圈持续壮大后对经济的潜在影响。比特币至少有六个传统货币没有的特性,其特性有一定程度的韧性可以抵御信贷扩张带来的问题。因为与其他货币相比,比特币并不像银行存款那样必须将资金存入银行。然而,比特币不能完全抵御传统制度中存在的信贷扩张,实际上人们可以像使用实物的现金一样将比特币存入金融机构。和相同的信贷扩张相比,比特币可能会有更大的防御力。

 

我们的推论的核心是在寻找银行存款与实体现金相比的优势,这些特点使大银行能够自由扩展信贷规模,并评估其优势在比特币生态圈的适用程度。如下表所示,在比特币的世界中,将资金存入银行的优势并不显着,因此我们认为比特币确实对信贷扩张具有独特的抵御能力。

 

实体现金和银行存款相比和比特币和比特币存款相比

特性 实体现金和银行存款相比 比特币和比特币存款相比
一、安全性 持有大量实体现金有被盗窃和现金折损的问题,与其相比在金融机构存款,可以提高存款安全性 在不将资金存入银行的前提下,比特币可以达到高水平的安全性

 

比如比特币可以透过隐藏或加密来保存

二、电子转账 使用银行系统,可以通过互联网或电话以低成本有效地汇款至全球各地。

 

如果使用实体现金,则必须经过缓慢,低效,不安全的资产转移过程

不用在金融机构存款的前提下,比特币可以允许用户通过互联网高效地转账
三、便利性 使用银行系统来管理你的钱,可以利用方便的工具。例如可以使用手机或电脑来转移资金

可以输入精确的转账金额,没有收取或计算零钱找换的烦恼

比特币可以允许用户在手机上进行付款,也不需要用户人手计算零钱找换金额。比特币也不要求用户存款在金融机构
四、存款赎回能力 在传统的银行体系中,从金融机构提取实体现金需要经历一个漫长的过程。因此,银行不需要储备大量实体现金 比特币可以允许用户快速从存款机构中提取资金,这会刺激银行随时确保拥有足够的比特币储备
五、审核性 传统银行提供跟踪,控制和监控所有交易的能力,这有助于防止欺诈

 

实体现金无法做到这点

比特币的区块链技术或其他的电子数据库可以允许用户在不使用第三方金融中介的前提下有效地审计和监控交易
六、”混合性银行” 在传统银行模式中,只有两个基本选择:

一、完全由用户控制的实体现金

二、储存在金融机构的存款

这是一个二选一的选择题,没有中间选项,迫使用户在没有折中方案的情况下做出困难的选择

比特币允许更广泛的存款和安全模型,导致更复杂的信贷扩张动态。 例如:

一、2之2多签名钱包,其中银行持有一个密钥,用户持有另一个密钥;或

二、1之2多签名钱包,银行持有一个密钥,用户持有另一个密钥


减少信贷扩张的经济情况

本文分析中并没有表示低信贷扩张的这种新经济模式会否对社会更有利,也不确定比特币在未来会否取得成功。前者是经过几十年经济学家不断辩论的课题,后者我们则认为是另一个课题。尽管经历了数十年辩论,比特币与它之前的货币截然不同,由于新的信息的加入而再次被摆上辩论的舞台中央是必要的。例如,基于银行存款和债务,并通过信贷扩张周期而导致通货膨胀或通货紧缩这种货币体系,可能与基于比特币的货币体系相比,所产生的经济后果是截然不同的。基于债务的货币体系若出现通货紧缩的一个关键问题是它将会提高债务的实际价值,而导致经济陷入下滑趋势。对于像比特币这种非债务型的货币体系,通货紧缩的影响仍然未知。


虽然比特币可能不一定会产生更优越的经济模型,但我们认为本文分析表明,比特币具有一些特性使得其经济模型与其之前的模型相比更为独特及有趣。因此,它似乎是一个值得深入研究的领域。

 

对许多人来说,比特币的最终目标是要占充分主导地位,使得信贷扩张规模大幅度下降,从而可以中和信贷周期,并消除经济周期。虽然这被认为是一个雄心勃勃的目标,我们也认为这个可能性非常低。而且即使比特币发展到上述规模的情况下,也可能出现其他不可预见的经济问题。

 

 

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