A complete history of Bitcoin’s consensus forks

Abstract: In this piece, we list 19 Bitcoin consensus rule changes (or 18 as an accidental one “failed”), which represents what we believe to be almost every significant such event in Bitcoin’s history. At least three of these incidents resulted in an identifiable chainsplit, lasting approximately 51, 24, and six blocks, in 2010, 2013 and 2015, respectively.

(Source: gryb25)


Term Definition
 Chainsplit A split in the blockchain, resulting in two separate chains, with a common ancestor. This can be caused by either a hardfork, a softfork, or neither.
 Consensus rule changes

A loosening of the consensus rules on block validity, such that some blocks previously considered as invalid are now considered valid.

Existing nodes are required to upgrade to follow the new hardforked chain.


A tightening of the consensus rules on block validity, such that some blocks previously considered as valid are now considered invalid.

Existing nodes do not necessarily need to upgrade to follow the new softforked chain.

Note: These terms are believed to have originated in April 2012 and formalized in BIP99 and BIP123.

List of Bitcoin consensus forks

Date Activation Block Number BIP Number or Software Version Description Type Outcome
28 July 2010 n/a1 0.3.5 OP_RETURN disabled, fixing a critical bug which enabled anyone to spend any Bitcoin. Softfork No evidence of any issues during this upgrade.
31 July 2010 n/a1 0.3.6 OP_VER and OP_VERIF disabled.3 Softfork Some users had trouble upgrading and it was recommended that nodes should be shut down if they could not be upgraded.2
The addition of the OP_NOP functions, although perhaps there was no usage of OP_NOP prior to this point. Hardfork
1 Aug 2010  n/a1 0.3.7 Separation of the evaluation of the scriptSig and scriptPubKey.  Fixing a critical bug which enabled anyone to spend any Bitcoin Potentially a non-deterministic hardfork No evidence of any issues during this upgrade
15 Aug 2010 74,638 0.3.10 Output-value-overflow bug fix following a 184.5-billion Bitcoin spend incident. The 0.5 BTC that was the input to the transaction remains unspent to this day. Softfork A chainsplit occurred.  Around five hours after the incident, a fix was released, client 0.3.10. It is believed that 51 blocks were generated on the “bad chain” before the “good” chain retook the PoW lead.
Disabling OP_CAT, which removed a DoS vector, along with the disabling of 14 other functions. Softfork
7 Sept 2010 n/a1 0.3.12 Adding the 20,000-signature operation limit in an incorrect way. This incorrect limit still exists. Softfork No evidence of any issues during this upgrade.
12 Sept 2010 79,400 n/a

Adding the 1MB blocksize limit.

The “MAX_BLOCK_SIZE = 1000000” commit occurred on 15 July 2010, which was released in the 0.3.1 rc1 version of the software on 19 July 2010. The commit enforcing the 1MB rule occurred on 7 September 2010, activating at block 79,400. On 20 September 2010, Satoshi removed this activation logic, but kept the 1MB limit.

Softfork No evidence of any issues during this upgrade.
15 March 2012 171,193 BIP30 Disallow transactions with the same TXID, unless the older one was fully spent. In September 2012, the rule was applied to all blocks, apart from 91,842 and 91,880, which violate the rule. Softfork This was a flag-day softfork. There is no evidence of any issues.
1 April 2012 173,805 BIP16 Pay-to-script hash (P2SH) allows transactions to be sent to a script hash (address starting with 3) instead of a public-key hash (addresses starting with 1). Softfork 55% activation threshold, over blocks in the seven days prior to 1 February 2012. Miners did not upgrade fast enough, so the evaluation point was delayed until 15 March.  Users running 0.6.0 rc1 who did not upgrade for the delay activated the softfork early and got stuck on block 170,060 when an invalid transaction, according to their nodes, was mined.    After activation, problems were caused as the remaining 45% of miners produced invalid blocks for several months after the softfork
24 Mar 2013  227,835 BIP34 Requires the coinbase transaction to include the block height. Softfork 95% activation threshold. A successful rollout occurred.
11 Mar 2013 225,430 0.8.0 This was an unplanned hardfork caused by the migration from Berkeley DB to LevelDB, which accidentally removed an unknown 10,000-BDB database lock limit. This caused a chainsplit on 11 March 2013, although the software which caused the error was released 20 days earlier on 20 February 2013. The change was reverted as the Bitcoin economy and miners switched back to 0.7.2 rules. No change in the consensus rules A chainsplit of at least 24 blocks occurred, with the 0.8.0 chain having a maximum lead of 13 blocks. A successful double spend also occurred. The original rules chain eventually re-took the PoW lead.
18 Mar 2013 n/a1 0.8.1 This was a temporary softfork, introducing a new rule requiring that no more than 4,500 TXIDs are referenced by inputs in a block. This rule is stricter  than the 10,000-BDB lock limit. The rule expired on 15 May 2013, a flag-day hardfork. Softfork There is no evidence of any issues.
15 May 2013 or 16 Aug 2013  252,451 or earlier BIP50 In August 2013, a block may have been produced that violated the original 10,000-BDB lock limit rule, which was relaxed on 15 May 2013. Hardfork There is no evidence of any issues.
4 July 2015  363,731 BIP66 Strict DER signature upgrade means Bitcoin is no longer dependent on OpenSSL’s signature parsing. Softfork 95% threshold over a 1,000-block period. A chainsplit occurred, lasting six blocks, as some miners signaled support for BIP66 but had not upgraded and were SPY mining. The new softfork rules chain eventually took the lead.
14 Dec 2015  388,380 BIP65 Check Lock Time Verify enables funds to be locked until a specific time in the future. This is Bitcoin’s first new function. Softfork Successful rollout using a 95% threshold.
4 July 2016  419,328 BIP68

Relative lock-time enables a transaction output to be banned for a relative amount of time after the transaction.


Median time-past removes the incentive for a miner to use a future block timestamp to grab more transaction fees.

Softfork Successful rollout using 95% versionbits signaling.
23 July 2017   477,800 BIP91 This temporary softfork makes signaling for the SegWit upgrade mandatory. Softfork Softfork successfully activated with an 80% miner threshold over a 336-block period, although only a tiny minority of users enforced BIP91 rules, which have since expired.  Therefore, the risk of a chainsplit was elevated in this period.
01 Aug 2017  478,479 BIP148 This temporary softfork makes signaling for the SegWit upgrade mandatory for a two week period following 1 August 2017. Softfork Flag-day softfork appeared to succeed with no issues, although only a minority of users enforced BIP148 rules, which have since expired. Therefore, the risk of a chainsplit was elevated in this period.
24 Aug 2017  481,824 BIP141
The segregated-witness (SegWit) upgrade. Softfork Rollout using 95% versionbits signaling.
The year 2262  13,440,000 BIP42 Fixed a 21 million coin supply cap bug.  The software was upgraded in April 2014 to fix this bug, but the new rule does not apply until the 23rd century. Softfork The softfork is not applicable yet.

(Sources: BitMEX Research, GitHub, Bitcoin blockchain)


  1. With the exception of the 1MB blocksize limit, prior to the 2012 BIP16 softfork, there was no activation methodology, so if the fork occurred smoothly without a chainsplit, there is not necessarily a specific block height or date on which the consensus fork occurred.
  2. “If you can’t upgrade to 0.3.6 right away, it’s best to shut down your Bitcoin node until you do.” — Satoshi Nakamoto
  3. Prior to the removal of OP_VER, each software upgrade could potentially be considered a non-deterministic hardfork and these have been excluded from this list. If the definition of hardforks does include this, then it’s a somewhat pedantic definition.
  4. There are no consistent definitions used in the above table because, for example, a different definition of the date on which the fork occurred may be more relevant in each incident, depending on the circumstances.
  5. Others have mentioned that changes to the P2P protocol can also be considered hardforks if they make previous software releases unusable, since they can no longer connect to the network. Strictly speaking, however, these do not relax the rules on block validity and one could sync old nodes by setting up a relay of intermediary versions of the software. These changes are excluded from the above list.
  6. Some consider BIP90 a hardfork, but since it only relaxed rules related to softfork activations that happened in the past, it does not share many of the characteristics or risks normally associated with consensus forks. Using the same logic, the block checkpoint scheme can also be considered as softforks.
  7. In July 2010, the chain selection rule was altered to shift to most accumulated work from the number of blocks. Technically, this is not a change to block validity rules; however, this change does share some of the risks associated with consensus rule changes.

Was the 2013 incident a hardfork?

In our view, on balance, the increase in the BDB lock limit a few months after the 11 March 2013 chainsplit was a hardfork. The rule in question was a 10,000-BDB lock limit, which was increased. The rule was relaxed on 15 May 2013 in software version 0.8.1, which was released on 18 March 2013. A block exceeding this limit may finally have been produced on 16 August 2013 so one can define the date of the hardfork to be either 15 May 2013 or 16 August 2013.

Some have argued that this may not have been a hardfork for a variety of reasons, including that this rule was “quasi-non-deterministic” or that one could manually change the BDB config settings. Indeed, due to the non-deterministic nature of the lock limit, perhaps it is theoretically possible one could have a local system set up such that the old BDB lock limit has never been breached. Therefore, one could declare that there has “never been a hardfork” in Bitcoin, following a strict definition that requires a hardfork to be deterministic or perhaps even directly related to Bitcoin data such as transactions or the block header.

When discussing this incident, Bitcoin developer Gregory Maxwell said:

Sort of a mixed bag there, you can actually take a pre BIP-50 node and fully sync the blockchain, I last did this with 0.3.24 a few months ago. It just will not reliably handle reorgs involving large blocks unless you change the BDB config too. So it’s debatable if this is a hard fork either, since it’s quasi-non-deterministic. There were prior bugs fixed where older versions would get stuck and stop syncing the chain before that too… So I think by a really strong definition of creating a blockchain which violates the rules mandated by prior versions we have never had a hardfork.

Chainsplit incident of July 2015

In the list of consensus rules changes above, there are three incidents that caused identifiable chainsplits. The most recent of these occurred on 4 July 2015, during the BIP66 softfork upgrade.

Immediately after the activation of BIP66, there was a six-block orphan chain created because a miner produced an invalid block that was not recognised as invalid by some other mining pools, because they were not validating new blocks.

In this case, some miners signalled support for the BIP66 softfork but hadn’t actually upgraded their nodes to validate; one could say miners were “false flagging”. If the miners had been validating blocks, they would have discovered the block was invalid and rejected it. Instead, some miners built on top of the invalid block and a chainsplit occurred.

A diagram illustrating these six blocks and the chainfork is displayed below.

Graphical illustration of the July 2015 chainsplit. (Source: Blockchain.info http://archive.is/WqGRp and http://archive.is/LHlF7)

Note: After the publication of this piece, an alternative list of consensus versions was published on the Bitcoin Wiki.


Whilst many claims made in this piece are cited, we do not guarantee accuracy.  We may have made errors or accidentally omitted consensus rule changes from the list.  We welcome corrections.

Bitcoin Gold: Investment flow data

Abstract: A few weeks ago, we published a piece on Bitcoin Cash and how one can analyse transaction data on the two blockchains involved in the split to draw conclusions about the potential investment flows between the two chains. Here is a similar analysis of Bitcoin Gold.

Bitcoin Gold overview

Bitcoin Gold (the BTG token) is a Bitcoin chainsplit token, similar to Bitcoin Cash. Anyone who held Bitcoin on block 491,406 (which occurred 24 October 2017) was allocated an identical amount of Bitcoin Gold. Some exchanges allowed customers to trade their Bitcoin Gold from this date based on customer balances at the time of the fork. However, the Bitcoin Gold blockchain itself did not appear to become usable until 14 November 2017, 21 days after the snapshot point.

Bitcoin Gold appears to aim to improve mining centralisation by switching the hashing algorithm from SHA256 to Equihash, which is currently more GPU-friendly than the ASIC-dominated SHA256.

Allocation of BTG to coin founders

Although the Bitcoin Gold project team does not always appear to want to make this fact well known, 100,000 coins were created then allocated to the team members. This consists of the block reward for 8,000 blocks, which with a block reward of 12.5 BTG amounts to 100,000 coins.

Based on the current spot price of BTG of US$450 per coin, this balance is worth approximately US$45 million. In the eyes of many, this seemingly unnecessary allocation is likely to damage the integrity of Bitcoin Gold. Bitcoin Cash, for example, did not have such an allocation. One could argue that Bitcoin Cash’s initial difficulty-adjustment mechanism also allowed an unusually large number of coins to be created in the initial period following the fork, although this seems somewhat fairer than what Bitcoin Gold did, as anyone could have mined the Bitcoin Cash tokens and they were not directly allocated.

Total coins spent

As of 20 December 2017, 2.61 million BTG have been spent at least once. In comparison, 4.7 million BTC have been spent since the snapshot point and 2.4 million BTC have been spent since Bitcoin Gold transactions became possible. Similarly, 4.1 million Bitcoin Cash was spent over an equivalent number of days following that token’s fork point.

The 2.61 million BTG that has been spent represents about 15.8% of all BTG. This is likely related to the level of divestment from Bitcoin Gold, mainly because this 2.61 million BTG is higher than a comparable first-time spend in Bitcoin over the same period.

Millions of coins of Bitcoin Gold (BTG) and Bitcoin (BTC) spent at least once since the chain split compared to the BTG price. (Source: BitMEX research, Bitcoin blockchain, Bitcoin Gold blockchain, Bitfinex price data)

Daily Bitcoin Gold spend for the first time

The average daily spend for the first time on Bitcoin Gold is falling slightly, compared to the initial period after the launch. In the last 10 days, the average daily spend for the first time was 44,000, compared to around 110,000 in the first 10 days.

Bitcoin Gold spent for the first time since the split (in daily millions) compared to the BTG price (Source: BitMEX research, Bitcoin Gold blockchain, Bitfinex price data)

Security incident

The official Bitcoin Gold GitHub repository may have been hacked for 4.5 days from 21 November to 25 November 2017, when the official website pointed to a malicious wallet. According to an announcement from the Bitcoin Gold team, the hacked wallet allowed the malicious entity to access funds sent to new Bitcoin Gold addresses provided by the wallet. Bitcoin was not affected as existing private keys were not compromised. It is not clear exactly what happened, but the Bitcoin Gold team claims that at least 80 BTG were stolen. Given the severity of this incident, the impact could have been far worse.

This incident illustrates why it’s important to handle these new fork tokens with caution. In particular, we would strongly advise you not to import your Bitcoin private key into these new fork token wallets without first spending the Bitcoin to a new output associated with a different private key after the token snapshot point, so that your Bitcoin is not at risk.





我们最近发表了一篇描述隐蔽 ASICBOOST 的文章,并且我们解释了对于特定矿池正在使用这种采矿方法的指控。有人声称这一指控的间接证据是一些矿池相比其他矿池产出更多的空白区块(或更多小区块)。

据我们所知,读者要求我们补充数据支持这段文章所述。因为在这个具体的主题上的公开数据是有限的,我们不会就空白区块的数据得出任何肯定的结论,但是我们提出供您参考。我们还就空白区块形成的原因给予了其他解释,包括 SPV 采矿和 SPY 采矿。


图 1 – 汇总图 – 矿池空白区块(超过 1,000 个区块周期)的滚动平均百分比


资料来源:Bitcoin Blockchain,BitMEX 研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)

备注:数据截至 2017 年 8 月 25 日。由于不同矿池开采区块的频率不同,图表上的相同日期可能反映不同时点



图 2 – 矿池产出空白区块占比 – 2017 年至今


备注:数据截至 2017 年 10 月 22 日

图3 – 矿池产出空白区块占比 – 2016 年


资料来源:Blockchain,BitMEX 研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)


图 4 – 矿池产出空白区块占比 – 2015 年

资料来源:Blockchain,BitMEX 研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)


图 5 – 矿池产出空白区块占比 – 2014 年


资料来源:Blockchain,BitMEX 研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)

图 6 – 矿池产出空白区块占比所有历史数据 – 每月数据

资料来源:Blockchain,BitMEX 研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)

备注:仅在单个月内得到300个以上的数据时才包括在内,数据截至 2017 年 10 月 22 日


图 7 – 自 2016 年后 – 矿池产出空白区块占比 – 每月数据

资料来源:Blockchain,BitMEX 研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)

备注:仅在单个月内得到 300 个以上的数据时才包括在内,数据截至 2017 年 10 月 22 日

图 8 – 2017 年至今 – 矿池产出空白区块占比 – 每月数据

资料来源:Blockchain,BitMEX 研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)

备注:仅在单个月内得到 300 个以上的数据时才包括在内,数据截至 2017 年 10 月 22 日

按年份排序的统计资料( 12 个月内排名前十的矿池)


图 9 – 2017 年(至 8 月 25 日)的汇总表

矿池 区块数目 平均区块大小 空白区块比例
Antpool 6,298 897KB 1.8%
F2Pool 3,897 919KB 1.3%
BTCC 2,733 896KB 0.7%
Bitfury 2,852 965KB 0.0%
BW Pool 2,034 933KB 0.1%
ViaBTC 1,990 952KB 0.4%
BTC.TOP 3,199 978KB 0.7%
Slush 1,921 947KB 0.4%
BTC.com 2,265 951KB 2.4%
HaoBTC 931 957KB 2.3%
BitClub 1,236 980KB 0.0%
All Blocks 35,899 936KB 1.1%

资料来源:Blockchain,BitMEX 研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)


图 10 – 2016 年汇总表

矿池 区块数目 平均区块大小 空白区块比例
Antpool 11,479 747KB 4.2%
F2Pool 11,444 772KB 0.9%
BTCC 7,023 718KB 0.8%
Bitfury 5,298 834KB 0.0%
BW Pool 5,373 710KB 2.5%
ViaBTC 1,995 822KB 0.7%
BTC.TOP 27 961KB 0.0%
Slush 2,842 720KB 0.5%
BTC.com 657 976KB 2.1%
HaoBTC 1,443 982KB 1.5%
BitClub 1,662 964KB 0.0%
All Blocks 54,851 776KB 1.8%

资料来源:Blockchain,BitMEX 研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)


图 11 – 2015 年汇总表

矿池 区块数目 平均区块大小 空白区块比例
Antpool 9,815 484KB 8.2%
F2Pool 10,851 499KB 4.0%
BTCC 5,780 390KB 0.1%
Bitfury 5,459 604KB 0.0%
BW Pool 4,129 495KB 4.5%
ViaBTC 0 n/a n/a
BTC.TOP 0 n/a n/a
Slush 2,445 492KB 1.2%
BTC.com 0 n/a n/a
HaoBTC 0 n/a n/a
BitClub 210 509KB 0.0%
All Blocks 54,311 480KB 3.1%

资料来源:Blockchain,BitMEX 研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)


无验证采矿 –  SPV 采矿和 SPY 采矿

SPV 采矿

为了构建新区块并延伸区块链,矿池只需要前一个区块的散列,不需要得到含有所有交易数据的完整区块。矿池的目的是以最快的方式制造区块并延伸区块链条,以此提高利润。因此,矿工经常试图在仍未下载并验证上一个区块的情况下开发下一个区块。如果发生这种情况,矿工通常会避免将任何交易数据放入区块中(除了支付矿工费用的交易之外),因为矿工不知道上一个区块中含有哪些交易,若区块中含有其他交易可能导致“重复支出”,使得区块被网络拒绝。用于描述上述行为的术语是 “ SPV 挖掘”。



SPY 采矿

经常使用的另一个术语是 “ SPY 挖掘” 。当一个矿池希望以更快的速度得到之前的区块时,他们通常作为一个矿工来参与矿池并与其他矿工竞争。然而,与其增加整体矿池实际的算力,他们的目的是利用矿池网络的便利性更快的找到先前区块的散列,然后进一步利用这些通过“窥探”自己所在的矿池获得的信息。



据说不同的矿池有不同的政策。例如 AntPool 在进行 SPV 采矿,而 Bitfury 则没有从事这种做法。如图 9 所示,Bifury 在 2017 年产生了 0.0% 的空白区块,而 Antpool 则为 1.8%。 SPV 矿业被认为是造成这种差异的主要原因。



上述因素可以解释空白区块比例的差异,而不是隐蔽的 ASICBOOST。或者,还有我们不知道的因素,即 SPV 采矿和 ASICBOOST 都不会对其造成变化。

然而,支持隐蔽 ASICBOOST 理论的人们已经能够使用空白区块的数据作为支持其理论的间接证据。例如,图8说明如下:

  • 直到 2017 年 4 月,Antpool(橙色)产出的空白区块比例最高,与其他矿池相比
  • 在 2017 年 4 月,这个公司变为 BTC.com(深蓝色),这是由同一家持有 Antpool 的公司所拥有
  • 2017 年 10 月,出现不明的矿工(浅绿色)开始生产空白区块,源自于 Antpool 试图掩盖他们采矿政策




另一个要考虑的因素是时间差。发生 SPV 挖掘是因为矿工们希望在上一个区块得到认证之前赶紧开始开采下一个区块。因此,在大多数情况下,矿工无法快速的找到下一个区块时,比如在 30 秒内,SPV 挖掘所带来的影响是有限的,因为矿工们依然有时间去验证。


下面图 12 重复了上述图 3 的资料数据,但这一次我们排除了在上一个区块被发现的 30 秒内产出的空白区块。这可以消除部分 SPV 采矿的影响。尽管关于时间的数据可能不可靠。

图 12 – 矿池产出空白区块占比 – 2016(距上一个区块 30 秒以上的时间差)


资料来源:Blockchain,BitMEX 研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)




在这篇文章中的分析只关注空白的区块。 而 ASICBOOST 的指控不仅涉及空白区块,还涉及小区块。由于 Merkle 树的尺寸较小,较小但非空白的区块也可以协助隐蔽 ASICBOOST。在稍后的一段中,我们将更详细地研究这些小区块的比例。

在下面的分析中,我们比较了两个特定矿池之间的区块和区块大小之间的时序。一个声称做SPV挖掘(Antpool)和一个(Bitfury)声称不实行 SPV 挖掘的矿池。

图表显示了矿池之间的不同不仅仅是空白区块,而且包括小的区块。图表显示,Bitfury 的图表相对“整洁”,只有在上一个块之间的时间间隔小的时候小区块才会生成。相比之下,Antpool 图表显得更加“凌乱”,无论与前一个区块之间的时间间隔如何,空的和较小的区块生成都比较普遍。

图 13 – Antpool( 2017 至今)- 区块大小与上一个区块之间的时间间隔相比

资料来源:Blockchain,BitMEX 研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)

注意:y 轴是上一个区块的时间间隔(以秒为单位),x 轴是以字节为单位的区块大小。时间间隔数据可能不准确


图 14 – BitFury(2017至今)- 区块大小与上一个区块之间的时间间隔相比

资料来源:Blockchain,BitMEX 研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)

注意:y 轴是上一个区块的时间间隔(以秒为单位),x 轴是以字节为单位的区块大小。时间间隔数据可能不准确






BitMEX (www.bitmex.com)









图 1 – 矿池区块大小分析(以字节为单位)- 2017 年

资料来源:Bitcoin Blockchain,BitMEX研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)

备注:数据截至 2017 年 10 月 22 日。期间产量不到 800 个区块的采矿池不包括在内


图 2 – 矿池区块大小分析(以字节为单位)- 2016 年

资料来源:Bitcoin Blockchain,BitMEX研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)

备注:期间产量不到 800 个区块的采矿池不包括在内


图 3 – 矿池区块大小分析(以字节为单位)- 2015 年

资料来源:Bitcoin Blockchain,BitMEX研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)

备注:期间产量不到 800 个区块的采矿池不包括在内。在此期间 BTCC Pool 有许多区块有两个笔交易记录

图 4 – 矿池每月小于 10,000 字节的非空白区块百分比

资料来源:Bitcoin Blockchain,BitMEX研究,Blockchain.info(矿池名称)

备注:本月生产不超过 250 个区块的矿池不包括在内



我们选择了 10 个区块大小范围:

  1. 小于 500 字节
  2. 500 字节到 5,000 字节
  3. 5,000 字节到 10,000 字节
  4. 10,000 字节到 25,000 字节
  5. 25,000 字节到 50,000 字节
  6. 50,000 字节到 75,000 字节
  7. 75,000 字节到 100,000 字节
  8. 100,000 字节到 250,000 字节
  9. 250,000 字节到 500,000 字节
  10. 500,000 字节到 1,000,000 字节

范围边界的选择是完全随意的,因此这可能会削弱分析的可靠性。图 1 似乎表明,10,000 字节的范围可能是最重要的,鉴于 2017 年某些矿工的显著增长。因此,我们选择少于 10,000 字节的非空白区块作为月分析的范围,如图 4 所示。



作为提醒,我们不认为上述数据是证明隐蔽 ASICBOOST 强而有力证据。有些人则认为,某些矿池的小区块或空白区块可能被认为是隐蔽 ASICBOOST 的间接证据,而不就这些指控提出数据支持。我们的目标是简单地就实际数据制作图表,说明矿池产出这些小区块的情况。





BitMEX (www.bitmex.com)

Public companies with exposure to the crypto space

Abstract:  The prices of crypto-related assets like Bitcoin have skyrocketed in recent months and many speculative investors understandably appear to want upside exposure to the space. However, the risk of a downwards correction is high, in our view. In this piece, we look at a potentially lower-risk method of obtaining upside by presenting a selection of listed equities which have some exposure and businesses in other areas.


The price of Bitcoin is up over 1,600% YTD, while many alternative coins such as Ethereum and Litecoin have appreciated in value to an even greater extent, leading, in our view, to significant downside price risk. For example, potentially another four-year cycle of weak prices could be driven by the Bitcoin halving schedule. Existing investors in the space may wish to take some profits but still retain some upside exposure, and new investors in the space may wish to obtain some upside exposure while mitigating some of the downside risks.

Here is a list of public companies with some business segments driven by crypto-related areas, which may benefit from further crypto price appreciation but which have other businesses that could mitigate the downside risks. Before investing in any of these, you should obviously do more research on your own: the information below is intended only as an introduction to the companies.

Stock Website Comment


http://www.tsmc.com Potentially a solid investment opportunity, with a strong high-margin business and good crypto upside linked to the core business.
http://www.alchip.com More work may be required to determine the significance of the crypto-related business.


https://www.gmofh.com Could be an interesting investment, although the crypto exchange is new and currently small in scale.


http://www.globalunichip.com Strong ASIC design business, however the stock is expensive.


https://www.gmo.jp Possible lack of focus on one crypto area.


https://www.overstock.com Possible lack of focus on one crypto area.


https://squareup.com Not clear if this business model has strong earnings power.


https://www.ig.com Crypto trading may just cannibalize the existing clients.


https://www.plus500.com Crytpo trading may just cannibalize the existing clients.
http://www.garage.co.jp The link to crypto is weak.


http://premiumwater-hd.co.jp The link to crypto is weak and it’s not clear how shareholders may benefit from an ICO.


http://www.cmegroup.com Crypto business may not be significant.


http://www.cboe.com Crypto business may not be significant.


http://www.sbigroup.co.jp A link to the “fake Satoshi”  may be worrisome.

A slightly more detailed look into the companies


Investment conclusion:

  • Investing in TSMC is likely to be a good way of obtaining some moderate upside exposure to crypto while significantly mitigating or eliminating the downside risk.


  • This Taiwanese company is the world’s largest semiconductor foundry. TSMC is a pure play, focusing entirely on integrated-circuit fabrication.
  • According to the most recent quarterly earnings call, the crypto-mining-related business is $375 million per quarter, which represents 5.1% of group sales. However, with crypto prices continuing to appreciate, it is likely that this business segment is growing very fast.

Investment case:

  • TSMC has extremely high profit margins, with an EBITDA margin of about 66% expected in 2017. In our view, the company is likely to be able to achieve similar margins in the crypto business.
  • With current crypto prices, miners and ASIC designers are likely trying to make very large orders with TSMC, which could mean significant sales growth next year. If the crypto prices increase significantly, orders in 2018 could be very strong. If one is  convinced 2018 is going to be a big year for crypto, TSMC could be a relatively less risky way of obtaining such exposure.
  • Crypto mining is a challenging and competitive business, and much of the profit could end up at the company supplying the key equipment. TSMC is well positioned to benefit regardless which mining company becomes dominant. As Mark Twain once said, “When everyone is looking for gold, it’s a good time to be in the pick and shovel business.”
  • TSMC also pays a healthy dividend, yielding c3.1%. The company has never cut its dividend and this should support the share price if the market weakens.
  • TSMC is very focused on the core business as a semiconductor foundry and will not be distracted by investing in other blockchain related areas like ICOs or Ripple. In our view, companies with focus tend to perform better over the long term.

Investment risks:

  • TSMC are believed to currently have only one crypto-mining client, Bitmain, so there is significant customer concentration risk.
  • The company has high exposure to Apple (APPL US) and the iPhone.

Valuation metrics:

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)


Investment conclusion:

  • Alchip may merit further investigation to establish the significance of the crypto business.


  • Alchip is a Taiwanese ASIC design and manufacturing company, of smaller scale than GUC (mentioned below).
  • We do not know how significant crypto mining is for this company. A page in a recent company presentation explained some of the Bitcoin-mining-related products and in 2015, the company completed the first mining 16-nm tap out for the now defunct KNC miner.

Investment case:

  • This company is less well known and therefore the upside from strong crypto growth in 2018 could be significant.

Investment risks:

  • The scale of the company’s Bitcoin business is not known.
  • The earnings track record is unreliable, with the company making loses in 2016.
  • The order outlook is said to have poor visibility relative to some other companies.
  • The stock is up 171% YTD, indicating the crypto exposure may already be reflected in the valuation.

Valuation metrics:

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)

GMO Financial Holdings

Investment conclusion:

  • GMO Coin may become a successful crypto exchange in Japan due to the company’s existing infrastructure and expertise. Therefore, GMO Financial could represent an interesting investment opportunity.


  • GMO Financial are a listed subsidiary of GMO Internet, with GMO Internet owing 80.8% of GMO Financial. Therefore, the shares are not very liquid.
  • This business includes a retail FX platform as well as the new GMO Coin exchange, which is 58% owned by GMO Financial.
  • The crypto-mining business and ICO will not occur within this subsidiary, but will occur at group level inside GMO Internet.

Investment case:

  • GMO Financial offers more direct exposure to the crypto-exchange business than the parent. The exchange business is reasonably new and therefore has considerable growth potential.
  • The FX trading-platform business is the largest retail platform in Japan, therefore GMO Financial may already have the infrastructure and expertise to build a successful crypto exchange.
  • The exchange plans to offer a leveraged product shortly.

Investment risks:

  • We have not been able to identify any trading-volume data at GMO Coin, therefore the market share is likely to be low. However, a recent company presentation indicates that growth is strong.
  • The company does publish monthly volume data for the non GMO Coin exchange businesses.

Valuation metrics:

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)

Global Unichip

Investment conclusion:

  • Valuation ratios appear reasonably expensive and the stock price may already reflect the benefits of crypto.


  • Global Unichip (GUC) is a Taiwanese fabless ASIC design company. TSMC holds about 34% of the shares in GUC, and the chairman of GUC also has a role at TSMC China.  However, TSMC’s technology library is open to other competing fabless companies.
  • Crypto-mining-related sales are believed to account for around 20% of GUC sales in 2017, and this is likely to grow significantly in 2018, in our view.

Investment case:

  • At 20%, the crypto business is a significant part of sales. The mining business could become more competitive in 2018, making ASIC design key. If crypto prices increase in 2018, GUC is likely to perform well.

Investment risks:

  • The stock price is already following crypto markets to some extent, with the shares up over 300% in USD this year. There is significant downside risk if crypto markets collapse but this is still less risky than actually holding crypto tokens.
  • The stock is expensive on a forward EV/EBITDA of 34.7x.
  • GUC is also reliant on machine-learning/AI areas for growth in addition to crypto.

Valuation metrics:

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)

GMO Internet

Investment conclusion:

  • GMO Internet appears to lack focus in their crypto endeavors, therefore GMO Financial may represent be a better investment opportunity.


  • GMO Internet is a group of Japanese companies based in internet infrastructure and digital payments. The main business lines of the company are online credit-card transaction processing, domain-name services, and SSL certificates.
  • In October 2017, the company announced the launch of a Bitcoin-mining business and a potential ICO.
  • The company also has a subsidiary called GMO Coin, a crypto exchange.

Investment case:

  • GMO offers broad exposure to different areas in crypto, ICOs, mining, and the operation of exchanges.
  • The core business of SSL certificates is enjoying strong growth, with sales up about 90% in 2017.

Investment risks:

  • The company is entering competitive fields and GMO appear to lack focus by trying many different areas at the same time. They may not succeed in all ambitions.
  • GMO plans to launch a 7-nm mining chip next year, which may be ambitious, especially as Bitmain is likely to be a strong competitor and it’s not clear who GMO’s mining-chip manufacturing partners are.
  • The effective ownership of the exchange business (GMO Coin) is low, at only 46%.

Valuation metrics:

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)


Investment conclusion:

  • The company may lack focus in the crypto space and the stock may already be rallying as a result of the crypto exposure.


  • Overstock is an American e-commerce company focused on furniture and bedding.
  • For several years, company CEO and founder Patrick Bryan has enthusiastically supported Bitcoin. This may stem from his anti-Wall Street stance, which itself grew after several prominent investment banks and hedge funds were accused of targeting Overstock with a naked short selling campaign in 2005. Bryan was eventually mostly vindicated after winning a payout in a settlement of the issue.
  • Overstock first accepted Bitcoin payments in 2014 and became involved in several projects, including the Counterparty platform in 2014 and then the tZERO platform, which first launched Overstock stock as an instrument in 2016 and is currently building a distributed ledger system.

Investment case:

  • Overstock offers broad exposure to the space.

Investment risks

  • Like many of the companies mentioned in this list, Overstock seems to lack focus and is experimenting with various crypto related ideas.
  • The shares are up 214% YTD, partly as a result of the crypto theme.

Valuation metrics:

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)


Investment conclusion:

  • The crypto story may already be well understood by the investment community and there may be considerable downside risk due to the valuation rating.


  • Square is a digital-payment-solutions company based in the US.
  • Square recently announced the launch of a new product that allows users to buy and sell Bitcoin on a mobile application.

Investment case:

  • The new Bitcoin application has received positive feedback since the launch for its ease of use.

Investment risks:

  • The stock is very expensive based on traditional valuation metrics.
  • The Bitcoin application does not offer users the ability to send payments on the Bitcoin network by itself.
  • It is not clear if the business model of buy/sell Bitcoin inside a mobile application is profitable.

Valuation metrics:

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)

IG Group

Investment conclusion:

  • A strong crypto business may cannibalise earnings from other areas, so the crypto-related upside may be limited.


  • IG Group is a UK-based CFD and spread-betting-platform company.
  • Due to their high volatility, crypto-related trading products are offered and are likely to be contributing to earnings as the volatility of other products is lower.

Investment case:

  • IG is one of the largest and strongest CFD companies in the retail space.

Investment risks:

  • One of the big challenges for the company is the regulatory environment in the UK and Europe. The retail leveraged trading industry is under close scrutiny by regulators.
  • While the crypto business may perform well, it’s not clear that this will result in new clients or whether IG’s existing clients will merely enjoy trading and switch to whichever product offers volatility.

Valuation metrics:

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)

PLUS 500

Investment conclusion:

  • Similar to IG, Plus 500’s stronger crypto sales may cannibalize earnings from other areas.


  • Plus 500 is a UK-based online retail trading platform.

Investment case

  • Plus 500’s technology platform lets it roll out new instruments faster than many of its peers, so it may be able to capitalise on new trends faster in the volatile crypto space.
  • Plus 500 trades at a discount to IG, due to IG’s stronger reputation and longer track record. However, customer retention at Plus 500 is improving and there is increased focus on loyal, higher-value customers rather than on speculative clients who may lose all their money and leave.

Investment risks:

  • Regulation and possible stricter rules related to CFDs are a major risk, just like for IG.

Valuation metrics:

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)

Digital Garage

Investment conclusion:

  • One could consider a pair trade, long Digital Garage and short Kakaku.com, although the link to a real crypto business seems insignificant and unlikely.


  • Digital Garage is a Japanese technology investment fund, with the primary asset being a price-comparison website called Kakaku.com (2371 JP).
  • Digital Garage also has an investment in the blockchain-infrastructure company Blockstream.
  • In theory, one could go long Digital Garage and short Kakaku.com to increase exposure to Blockstream.

Investment case:

  • Blockstream has rolled out a satellite product, broadcasting Bitcoin blocks all over the world.

Investment risks:

  • Blockstream’s business model appears unclear. The company seems focused on technology and infrastructure rather than on commercialisation and therefore may not be able to generate earnings.
  • The link to Blockstream is very limited.

Valuation metrics:

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)

Premium Water Holdings

Investment conclusion:

  • The link to the crypto space may be too weak.


  • Premium Water is a high-growth mineral-water delivery company in Japan, delivering water to the home and office markets.
  • According to page 10 of the COMSA whitepaper, the company will conduct an ICO, perhaps to raise funds to invest in business expansion. COMSA is a Japanese centralized ICO solutions company that recently conducted a token sale themselves.

Investment case:

  • It is possible that the company could raise a significant amount of funds in an ICO and there is a chance that existing shareholders may benefit from this.

Investment risks:

  • It is not clear how existing shareholders will directly benefit from the ICO, if at all.

Valuation metrics:

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)

CME Group

Investment conclusion:

  • Crypto is not likely to be a significant earnings driver.


  • CME Group operates an institutional derivatives exchange that deals with futures contracts and options. The instruments are related to interest rates, stock indexes, FX, and commodities.
  • The company recently announced the launch of Bitcoin futures contracts.

Investment case:

  • Financial speculation appears to be one of the main activities Bitcoin is used for and the launch of a Bitcoin product could therefore lead to significant volume growth for the CME.

Investment risks:

  • The Bitcoin product is new and it is not clear whether there will be significant demand relative to the CME’s other products.
  • On a forward EV/EBITDA of 21.0x, the stock is already reasonably expensive.

Valuation metrics:

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)


Investment conclusion:

  • Crypto is not likely to be a significant earnings driver.


  • CBOE operates an institutional financial-options-trading platform. The main instruments are related to FX and stock indexes.
  • The company recently announced the launch of Bitcoin futures contracts.

Investment case:

  • Similar to the CME, financial speculation appears to be one of the main activities Bitcoin is used for, and the launch of a Bitcoin product could therefore lead to significant volume growth for CBOE.

Investment risks:

  • The Bitcoin product is new and it is not clear whether there will be significant demand relative to CBOE’s other products.
  • On a forward EV/EBITDA of 24.4x, the stock is already reasonably expensive.

Valuation metrics:

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)

SBI Holdings

Investment conclusion:

  • A partnership with “fake Satoshi”, Craig Wright, is a significant concern. We do not recommend investing in SBI.


  • SBI Holdings is a Japanese financial company whose main business is the domestic online stock-trading platform. SBI can be considered a peer to GMO.
  • SBI holdings appears enthusiastic about the crypto space. The company has a crypto fund, with investments in Ripple, R3, Orb, Coinplug, Wirex, Veem, and bitFlyer (source).
  • SBI plans to make further investments, including into Bitcoin mining. SBI also has a blockchain consulting business, including advising on ICOs.

Investment case:

  • SBI Holdings offers broad exposure to many areas in the space.

Investment risks:

  • SBI recently announced a strategic partnership with nChain, the company run by Wright, known inside the Bitcoin community as the “fake Satoshi”. This may indicate that SBI has limited knowledge about the crypto space or that the company may be wasting shareholder funds, by partnering with Wright.
  • SBI also appears to lack focus in its blockchain strategy.

Valuation metrics:

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)

Other listed crypto-related names

Ticker Name Market cap (million USD) 2017 YTD return (USD) Description Blockchain pure play
4751 JP Cyberagent 4,814 50.0% Operates a media website, Ameba, and provides an advertising agency, foreign-exchange-trading website, and PC and mobile content. Potentially preparing for its own cryptocurrency exchange. No
3774 JP Internet Initiative Japan 841 16.2% Provides Internet connection services for businesses. Preparing Bitcoin services. No
6172 JP Metaps 365 (24.6%) Develops  advertising  platforms for smart phones. Potentially preparing for its own cryptocurrency exchange. No
3825 JP Remixpoint 322 359.9% An electricity retail business, energy-saving consulting. and used-car business.  BITPoint Exchange business. No
2315 JP CAICA  231 (7.7%) Provides information-systems solution services for financial and telecommunication industries. Issues a cryptocurrency “Caica”. No
3696 JP Ceres   216 34.8% Provides Internet marketing services.  Operates CoinTip service. No
3853 JP Infoteria 177 47.6% Provides software development based on XML.  Issues a cryptocurrency “Zen”. No
8732 JP Money Partners    133 (18.0%) Provides foreign-exchange transactions.  Alliance with the Kraken exchange. No
3807 JP Fisco  125 22.4% Provides financial information.  Exchange and deal with MonaCoin. No
8704 JP Traders Holdings   120 (8.7%) Provides financial services through Internet and call centers. Quoinex exchange business. No
3121 JP MBK  102 36.7% Provides loans and investments services for firms and real estates in Japan and China. Invested in BTCBOX exchange No
3808 JP OKWave   43 36.6% Q&A community website OKWave. Potentially preparing for its own cryptocurrency exchange. No
2377 TT Micro-Star 2,058 5.6% Also known as MSi. Manufactures and markets motherboards, graphics cards, and other computer peripherals. No
2376 TT Gigabyte Tech 1,102 28.8% Manufactures and markets computer motherboards No
3515 TT AsRock 296 100.6% Develops, designs, and retails motherboards No
2399 TT BioStar Micro 84 70.5% Manufactures and markets computer motherboards and interface cards No
6150 TT TUL Corp 68 312.3% Develops, manufactures, and markets graphics  cards, multimedia products, and interface cards No
United States
NVDA US Nvidia 116,085 80.2% Designs, develops, and markets graphics processors and related software. No
AMD US AMD 9,928 (9.3%) Manufactures semiconductor products. No
GBTC US Bitcoin Investment Trust 5,139 2,383.0% Trust invested exclusively in Bitcoin. Yes
RIOT US Riot Blockchain 275 732.7% Buys cryptocurrency and blockchain businesses, and supports blockchain-technology companies. Yes
SSC US Seven Starts Cloud Group 262 241.5% Provides artificial-intelligence, blockchain and fintech-powered digital-finance solutions No
MGTI US MGT Capital  204 475.3% Operates a portfolio of cybersecurity technologies. Yes
DPW US Digital Power 103 686.4% Designs, develops, manufactures, and markets switching power supplies for sale to manufacturers of computers and other electronic equipment. No
HIVE CN Hive Blockchain 636 n/a Operates as a cryptocurrency-mining firm. Yes
BTL CN BTL Group 197 991.7% Develops blockchain technologies. Yes
CODE CN 360 Blockchain 33 600.0% Invests in blockchain-based technology. Yes
DCC AU Digitalx 106 495.7% ICO advisory and blockchain consulting services Yes

(Source: Bloomberg, BitMEX Research)


This piece does not constitute investment advice. You should do your own research before deciding to make any investments.








  1. 低交易费用
  2. 规避审查能力
  3. 电子支付特性



1. 低交易费用


然而,虽然比特币比一些中央支付系统便宜且容易使用,但仍在许多时候,中央支付系统比比特币更快,更便宜。例如在许多西欧国家,国内零售银行间转账是免费且即时到账的。在中国,阿里巴巴(BABA US)和腾讯(700 HK)也正提供着快速,简单,便宜的支付解决方案。据说腾讯每秒能够处理 20 万笔交易,远远超过比特币所能达到的水平。有些人可能会把这些情况视为比特币的风险,而另一些人则认为这是一场比特币永远赢不了的战争。尽管目前世界上仍不是每个人都能得到快速且免费的支付方案,所以比特币可以填补这块市场空缺。但是,如果传统的支付供应商最终能够提供即时和免费支付方案,那么比特币的发展又是否是可持续的,假设比特币永远也提供不了这些支付优势?



2. 无需许可证和能够规避审查的钱


  • 在没有许可的情况下仍可以使用支付系统的特性,
  • 政府或当局无法阻止支付,
  • 当局无法逆转已经发生的支付,而且,
  • 避免整个系统倒闭的特性。


值得一提的是,比特币有一个有趣的特性是实物现金所没有的,就是对整个货币体系规则的审查的规避。在比特币中,最终用户有能力执行系统中的所有规则,这是实物现金所办不到的。这确保了比特币一些有趣的特征,例如 2100 万个供应上限,或其他防止通胀相关的货币政策,这都是实物现金所做不到的。在这方面,就其货币特征而言,比特币可以说是最像“数字黄金”。





  • 汇往或收到来自资本管制国家的资金,
  • 受到政治压迫的个人的资金使用限制,
  • 未经监管机构,制造商或服务提供商的允许,以较低价格从其他地区购买产品或服务,例如药品,消费电子产品或媒体订阅服务,
  • 向政治敏感的项目捐款,
  • 销售没有办理登记手续的汽车,
  • 未经授权销售有版权资料,如教科书,
  • 未经授权销售计算机软件或数码内容等,
  • 未经授权进行场外股票交易,
  • 在不符合监管要求的情况下参与在线赌博或扑克,
  • 在违反票上印制的条款的情况下出售体育赛事门票,
  • 在二级市场的销售航空公司的飞行里数,
  • 在没有达到银行开户年龄的青少年,使用在线电子商务系统或在商店使用移动支付技术,
  • 在一个不接受女性有银行账户的社会上,使用在线电子商务系统的女性,
  • 向没有销售税或就业登记的基本服务支付费用,如保姆等,
  • 向非法移民或没有公民身份的保姆支付费用,或
  • 向情报服务或线人支付费用。





汇丰英国信用卡合格的申请人标准 – 要求用户超过18岁




3. 电子支付










能否提供低交易费用 能否提供审查规避功能 能否进行电子交易





我们得出这样的结论:比特币的 “重要性” 是具备了传统上只有在使用实物现金时才有的特性,但是为了迎合数字时代,它以电子的形式出现。成为一个 “电子现金系统” 。因此,只相信我们正面临着“数字黄金”与现金支付系统之间二元的选择,是个错误的观念。比特币可以被视为数字黄金,实物现金和传统电子支付系统之间的混合选项。




BitMEX (www.bitmex.com)


摘要:在 2017 年 9 月初,我们发布了比特币现金(也被称为 BCash ),以及如何分析两个区块链上的交易数据,试图得出两条区块链之间的潜在投资流向。在本文中我们根据额外三个月的数据更新了该分析。



与比特币现金相比,比特币在硬分叉刚结束后花费了至少一次的情况较多。然而,比特币现金在九月初花费次数明显增加了。自此之后,这两个加密硬币的消费情况是势均力敌的。截至 2017 年 11 月 29 日,在硬分叉结束后分别有 650 万比特币和 630 万比特币现金至少花费了一次。


图 1 – 比特币现金(BCH)与比特币(BTC) – 区块链分叉后至少花费一次的加密货币数量

资料来源:BitMEX 研究,比特币区块链,比特币现金区块链,Bittrex(价格数据)



尽管出现了几次价给高峰,通常在比特币现金价格上涨之后,每天(自硬分叉以来)第一次花费的比特币现金数量持续下降。在过去的五天中,平均每日首次支出仅为每天約 19,000 个,而八月份则为 50,000 个左右。


图 2  – 区块链分叉后以来首次花费的比特币现金(每日)

资料来源:BitMEX 研究,比特币现金区块链,Bittrex(价格数据)



对于交易量来说,与我们就硬分叉发生后得到有些令人费解的首次支出数据相比,这个数据相对正常,数据方面也没有太大的变化。自硬分叉以来,累计比特币现金交易总额是比特币的 5.5%。虽然这一数字略有上升,但过去 10 天平均为 6.0%,而总体数字为 5.5%。

图 3 – 每日交易量(交易次数)

资料来源:BitMEX 研究,比特币区块链,比特币现金区块链,Bittrex(价格数据)



在比特币现金已存在的四个月内,在硬分叉时存在的所有加密货币的 38.5% 已经在比特币现金区块链上花费至少一次。在我们看来,这是一个非常高的数字,考虑到数百万美元的加密货币在几年前已经永远丢失了。

图 4 – 比特币现金(BCH)- 区块链分叉后支出与未支出的加密货币的比例

资料来源:BitMEX 研究,比特币现金区块链








BitMEX (www.bitmex.com)

Update: Bitcoin Cash investment flow data

Abstract: In early September 2017, we published a piece on Bitcoin Cash (also known as BCash or BCH) and how one can analyse transaction data on the two blockchains involved in its split from Bitcoin to try to draw conclusions about the potential investment flows between the two chains. In this piece, we update the analysis with another three months’ worth of data.

Total coins spent

Bitcoin had an initial lead over Bitcoin Cash in total coins spent at least once since the fork but Bitcoin Cash caught up in early September. Since then, both coins have been approximately neck and neck.  As of 29 November 2017, 6.5 million Bitcoin and 6.3 million  Bitcoin Cash coins have been spent at least once since the fork.

Bitcoin Cash (BCH) and Bitcoin (BTC) spent at least once since the chainsplit. (Source: BitMEX research, Bitcoin blockchain, Bitcoin Cash blockchain, Bittrex price data)

Daily Bitcoin Cash spend for the first time

Although there have been several spikes, normally after a rally in the Bitcoin Cash price, the number of Bitcoin Cash coins spent each day (for the first time since the fork) continues to decline. In the last five days, the average daily first time spend has been just circa 19,000 per day, compared to lows of around 50,000 in August.

Bitcoin Cash coins spent for the first time since the split (daily). (Source: BitMEX research, Bitcoin Cash blockchain, Bittrex price data)

Transaction volume

There is not much change in the two chains’ relative transaction volumes, a more normal metric compared to our somewhat convoluted “first-time spend since the fork” metric. The total cumulative Bitcoin Cash transaction volume is 5.5% of Bitcoin’s since the fork.  Although this figure is increasing slightly, averaging 6.0% in the last 10 days.

Daily transaction volume of BCH and BTC. (Source: BitMEX research, Bitcoin blockchain, Bitcoin Cash blockchain, Bittrex price data)

Proportion of Bitcoin Cash coins spent

In the first four months of Bitcoin Cash, 38.5% of all coins that existed at the time of the fork have been spent at least once on the Bitcoin Cash chain. This is a remarkably high figure, considering many millions of coins are likely to have been lost forever years ago.

Proportion of Bitcoin Cash (BCH) spent vs. unspent since the chainsplit. (Source: BitMEX research, Bitcoin Cash blockchain)


The data above shows that, after just four months, there may have been considerable investment flows between the two coins. Many supporters of each coin may have already made their respective investment/divestment decisions, and the future of each coin may now be determined more on merit or utility rather than on the opinion of the holders at the time of the fork.

We would like to remind readers that there are many weaknesses with respect to this analysis, the main one being that a spend on the Bitcoin Cash chain does not necessarily relate to a divestment.

重访 DAO

摘要:在这篇文章中,我们将重新审视 “DAO” 以及其失败后发生的事件。我们分析一下 DAO 内部的资金池发生了什么事,其中包括它造成分裂后的两条区块链。我们发现 DAO 仍然有约 1.4 亿美元资金无人认领。



  • DAO 黑客似乎控制了价值约 6,000 万美元的加密货币。
  • 目前在 DAO 回撤合同中还有大约 1.4 亿美元的资金无人认领。
  • 2017 年 6 月,DAO 内部无人认领的美元价值高于 2016 年 5 月融资初始价值。
  • 截止日期即将到来,在 2018 年 1 月 10 日之后,这些无人认领的 2,600 万美元资金将不可再被认领。


2016 年 5 月起 DAO 的营销材料




在 2016 年初夏,一个项目 “DAO” 在加密社区里中引起了许多关注。DAO 的全称是 “Decentralized Autonomous Organization”(去中央化的自治团体)。由于许多人对全称感到困惑,“DAO” 便成为了该项目的名字。DAO本意是成为自主投资基金,投资于加密货币持有者所认可的项目。该基金将由“代码就是法律”的理念来管理,而不是传统投资基金中关键人物为核心由上而下的管控机制。



该基金当时筹集了价值约 1.5 亿美元的以太币,约为当时存量的 14% ,而投资者预计能得到惊人的回报。投资者认为价格下行风险很小或基本为零,因为只要您愿意,随时就可以从 DAO 中撤出以太币。事实上,这个是一个复杂而容易出错的设置。


DAO 的问题

事实证明,DAO 在几个层面上存在本质上的缺陷,正如以太坊基金会的许多人在漏洞发生之前所指出的那样。例如:

  • 经济激励 – 该项目的激励机制思路不清。例如,对投资者而言,他们就项目投反对票的激励不大,因为投“否定票”的选民也将投资于经批准的项目。那些没有投票的人是不会接触到该项目的。另外,对于成功投资后收益退回 DAO 的执行方式机制还没有建立一个稳定的机制。
  • 加密货币可行性 – 项目创建时,已表明最终会创建新的 DAO 加密货币,以便不同加密货币的持有人可以获得不同的风险和回报。这就意味着加密货币的相互交易性偏弱,这是一个交易所和社区不大了解的问题。
  • 有漏洞的代码 – 代码并不一定能实现它所描述或预期的内容。智能合同代码的审查似乎不够充分。编码员似乎没有完全掌握它的语言,即 Solidity,合同也没有达到编码员想要达到的效果。


在加密货币销售结束后的几个星期,一个“黑客”设法在代码中找到了漏洞,使他们可以转移 DAO 的资金。然后将资金集中到一个黑客控制的子 DAO 中。这导致了以太币后来的硬分叉,以此来试图阻止黑客获得这些资金,并将资金退还给初始投资者。由于以太坊社区的部分人对此举感到不满,导致了 ETH 和 ETC 之间的区块链分裂。



  • 描述 DAO 主要参与者之间的关系,
  • 重温以太币的 DAO 硬分叉关键事件,
  • 探索 DAO 内的 ETH 和 ETC 资金的流动和
  • 推测未被认领的资金下场将会如何。


与 DAO 有关的主要团体和个人

与 DAO 有关的主要团体和个人关系图

资料来源:BitMEX 研究,下表提供了完整的资料来源

备注:还有其他以太坊基金会成员与 DAO 没有任何关联,这些成员被排除在上述图表之外。蓝色圆圈代表个人;而黄色圆圈代表团体。


DAO 的主要参与者的名单

名称 描述 参与方
DAOHub.org 推广DAO的社区网,由DAO.Link管理 Felix Albert, Auryn Macmillan, Boyan Balinov, Arno Gaboury, Michal Brazewicz, Taylor Van Orden, Des Donnelly, Daniel McClure(资料来源
Slock.it Slock.it 为 DAO 写的代码, 该公司本来希望开发智能锁。Slock.it 原先预计由DAO来融资 Stephan Tual, Lefteris Karapetsas, Griff Green, Christoph Jentzsch, 他的弟弟 Simon Jentzsch, Gavin Wood和Christian Reitwießner(资料来源
黑客 利用 DAO 漏洞的团体 匿名
DAO 加密货币持有人(DTH)

公众个人投资者透过集资和购买DAO 加密货币来投资

22,873 个账户持有人(资料来源
DAO 监管人 独立于Slock.it的第三方“仲裁人“,为DAO衍生出来的冲突及问题提供解决方案 Taylor Gerring, Viktor Tron, Christian Reitwießner, Gustav Simonsson, Fabian Vogelsteller, Aeron Buchanan, Martin Becze, Vitalik Buterin, Alex Van de Sande, Vlad Zamfir 和 Gavin Wood (资料来源

备注:Gavin Wood 在DAO事件发生前辞去了监管人的职位

Bity 与 Slock.it 合作的加密货币交易所,在瑞士设立。  该交易所发出WHG 的公告。(资料来源 Alexis Roussel(资料来源
DAO.Link 由 Slock.it and Bity 成立的瑞士合资公司,它们设立管理 DAOHub 官网(一个推广 DAO 的官网,见上图) Stephan Tual, Simon Jentzsch, Alexis Roussel(资料来源
Robin Hood Group (RHG) “white hat” group的前身, 它们在 DAO 资金硬分叉前持有大部分 DAO 资金。

公开人员: Alex Van de Sande, Griff Green, Lefteris Karapetsas
Stephan Tual 提到: “以太坊基金会成员包括程序员,安全专家, ethcore, slock, 等”(资料来源

Whitehat Group (WHG) 由 RHG 手中接过 ETC 所有权的组织。WHG 与 Bity 有着很深的关系。 公众所知道的成员包括 Jordi Baylina 和 Griff Green(资料来源
以太坊基金会 创造以太坊背后的非营利机构 许多个人,包括一些以太坊的创始人(资料来源





日期 事件 资金来源
2016 年 4 月 30 日 DAO 启动集资(资料来源:Slock.it
2016 年 5 月 25 日 DAO集资结束 集资了约 1,150 万硬分叉前的ETH
2016 年 6 月 17 日 DAO 资金被黑客给转移到了Child DAO
约 360 万硬分叉前的 ETH转移到了黑客的子 DAO


在DAO的监管设定下,“子 DAO ”可以与主 DAO “分离”,类似于公司分拆。

黑客利用递归调用漏洞从主 DAO 中取走比原计划中更多的资金。新成立的子 DAO 的所有者不能立即提取这些资金;他们必须等到投票期结束才能获得这些资金,届时才能自由转让。


这个投票期为以太坊社区提供了一个机会,他们通过利用相同的漏洞将资金从黑客的子 DAO 归还。然而,这可能会导致永久性分裂和 “ DAO 战争”,只要黑客和 RHG 都不放弃,资金将永远陷入僵局。这个对抗机制在编码上的难度不大,所以双方都不需要花太多时间和精力。



日期 事件 资金流动
2016 年 6 月 12 日
RHG 打响 “ DAO战争” 并恢复了大部分资金(资料来源:Reddit
利用相同的漏洞, 约810万硬分叉前 ETH 回流到 RHG 的子 DAO 中
2016 年 6 月 24 日
提出以软分叉方式保障被 “ DAO 战争” 攻击的约 360 万硬分叉前ETH(资料来源:Ethereum Foundation 可以屏蔽交易,避免黑客提取在它们子 DAO 的资金
2016 年 6 月 28 日
发现了 “ DAO 战争 ” 软分叉的严重漏洞,并放弃了这个方案(资料来源:Hacking Distributed


在这一点上,RHG 已经设法通过利用其他子 DAO 来保障大约 70% 的资金,但为了保证能够回收剩下的约 30%(大约 360 万个硬分叉前 ETH ),硬分叉是唯一的可行方案。此外,软分叉提案被发现有严重的安全漏洞,并迅速被否决了。


日期 事件 资金流动
2016 年 7 月 20 日
硬分叉实施后,有效的解决了 DAO 攻击的影响,使分叉 ETH 区块链上的 DTH 恢复。这个方案通过两个撤销合同来实施。

(资料来源:Ethereum FoundationThe Ethereum Wiki)

约 1,150 万分叉后的 ETH 返回到 DAO 提取合同中,并且可以由 DTH 根据投资人当时持有的 DAO 加密货币余额提取
RHG 和 DAO 黑客最终是可以挪动子 DAO 中的 ETC 的


硬分叉后,形成了两个平行的区块链。一个是 ETH ,黑客被不存在了,一个是 ETC ,黑客依然存在。 RHG 仍然保障了大约 70% 的 ETC,并且可以继续使用前面提到的 “ DAO 战争” 战略在 ETC 链上继续进行攻击,但是他们决定不这样做。为了退还 ETH 链上的 DTH ,他们决定使用提款合​​同,其必须以 DTH 来提取其 ETH 。


日期 事件 资金流动
2016 年 7 月 23 日
ETC 在 Poloniex 上市,其他交易所也纷纷效仿。 ETC / 美元达到 ETH / 美元价格的三分之一(资料来源:Twitter 不适用
2016 年 8 月 9 日
RHG 将 ETC 资金的所有权交给了 WHG 。随着 ETC 子 DAO 的成熟后,WHG 在他们的 ETC multisig 钱包中接收资金(资料来源:Bity WHG 保障了约 810 万个 ETC
2016 年 8 月 10 日
未经公布的消息表明,WHG / Bity使用 Bity 的“经验证服务业务”账户尝试在 4 个交易所上以 ETC 换取 ETF , BTC 和 EUR(资料来源:Bity

Poloniex 冻结了 230 万个 ETC ,Kraken 容许交易继续进行,但冻结了 130 万个 ETC,Bittrex继续交易了 82,000 个 ETC,Yunbi 继续交易了 101,000 个  ETC
2016 年 8 月 12 日
大部分这些 ETC 被冻结后,WHG / Bity 宣布他们已经决定不出售 ETC 来换取 ETH ,而是将 ETC 分配给 DTH(资料来源:Reddit Bity 把 BTC,ETH 和 EUR 兑换为约 150 万 ETC,让余额回升到约 810 万 ETC





日期 事件 资金流动
2016 年 8 月 26 日
Bity 宣布推出 “Whitehat 退出合同”(资料来源:Bity 不适用
2016 年 8 月 30 日
Bity 宣布,“Whitehat退出合同” 的第一个版本已经发布(资料来源:Bity 约 420 万个 ETC 从 WHG 汇入取款合约,DTH 持有约 60 万个。DTH 持有权是根据在硬分叉的时点 DAO 加密货币余额,而不是像ETH那样根据当前持有的加密货币余额来计算。
2016 年 8 月 30 日 Bity 宣布第二版 “Whitehat 退出合同” 已经发布(资料来源:Bity
约 380 万 ETC 从旧合同转到新合同
2016 年 9 月 6 日
Bity 宣布,其余的 ETC(包括试图在交易所进行交易的 ETC 和一些来自成熟子 DAO 的交易)被转移到 Whitehat 退出合同(资料来源:Bity
约 430 万 ETC 从 WHG 交换账户和多重转账汇入取款合同。

在进行这些交易的时候,ETC 的价格相对于 ETH ,BTC 和 / 或 EUR 下跌,导致交易回到 ETC,结果另外增加了 700,000 个 ETC 到Whitehat撤出合同中。这些交易所掉期的具体细节并没有公开。



资料来源: Gliffy


日期 事件 资金流动
2016 年 9 月 6 日
DAO 黑客将资金从他的“黑客子 DAO ”中转移 (资料来源:Gas Tracker
约 360 万个 ETC 由黑客持有
2016 年 9 月 6 日 DAO Hacker 向 ETC 发展基金捐赠了一些 ETC(资料来源:Gas Tracker 1,000 ETC 汇给了 ETC 发展基金
2016 年 10 月 25 日至 2016 年 12 月 7 日 DAO 黑客将资金转入许多不同的账户,换成不同的货币(资料来源:Gas Tracker
约 30 万个 ETC 被黑客转移


在写这篇文章的时候,黑客还没有触及绝大多数未被领取的 ETC ,这数量达到3,360,332个 ETC,价值 5,800 万美元。


Whitehat 退出合同的一个特点是,ETC 资金退出有一个限时规定(原定为 3 个月,于 2017 年 1 月 30 日到期)。由于大部分资金在三个月内没有申领,所以这个期限又延长了两倍:


日期 事件 资金流动
2017 年 1 月 30 日 Bity 宣布将 ETC Whitehat 退出合同截止日期延长至 2017 年 4 月 14 日
2017 年 4 月 14 日 RHG 宣布将 ETC Whitehat 退出合同截止日期延长至 2018 年 1 月 10 日
2018 年 1 月 10 日 ETC Whitehat 退出合同截止日期 ?


从那时起至今没有发生重大事件;绝大多数 ETH 基金已经被 DTH 撤回,ETC 大部分也是如此。



截至二零一七年十一月十九日,无人认领资金约为 1.4 亿美元,如下图所示。


在 ETH 链上的 DAO 相关基金

项目 ETH 无人认领的资金
DTH 提取的 ETH 11,286,046 97.3%
在 DAO 撤回中无人认领的 ETH (资料来源) 235,414 86.6 2.0%
在 DAO ExtraBalance 中无人认领的 ETH (资料来源) 76,204 28.0 0.7%
未被认领总额 311,618 114.7 2.7%
总额 11,597,664   100.0%

资料来源:BitMEX 研究,Ethereum blockchain

备注:美元 / ETH 价格为 368 美元


在 ETC 链上的 DAO 相关基金

项目 ETC 美元 (百万) 百分比
被黑客持有的 ETC 3,642,408 66.6  30.1%
透过 DTH 提取的 ETC(包括捐赠) 7,035,319 58.2%
无人提取的 ETC (资料来源 1,405,072 25.8 11.6%
WHG 资金总额 8,440,391   100.0%
黑客及 WHG 资金
总额 12,082,799

资料来源:BitMEX 研究,Ethereum Classic blockchain

备注:美元 / ETH 价格为 18.3 美元


在 ETC 链上的 DAO 相关基金

资料来源:BitMEX 研究,Ethereum Classic blockchain


随着时间的推移无人认领的 DAO 余额 –  ETH 和 ETC



无人认领的 DAO 余额 – 美元

资料来源:BitMEX 研究,Coinmarketcap,Github


如上图所示,在 2017 年 7 月的以太币价格高峰期,DAO 取款合约中无人领取的 “以太币” 的美元价值甚至高于最初筹集的 1.5 亿美元。


退出合同 “陷阱”




所有这三个撤回合同都有 “安全孵化” 机制,这意味着这些合同的 “所有者” 有能力在任何时候提取所有的资金。



虽然 DAO 监管人并没有表示这是计划的一部分,但如果认为没人会再提取这些资金,这些资金会很诱人。相比之下,WHG 专门设计了合同来确保这种情况的发生。


Whitehat 截止日期

Whitehat 退出合同也有一个 DTH 能够提取资金的超时系统。截止日期将于 2018 年 1 月 10 日到期(虽然之前已经延长了两次),所以在此期限之后取款的尝试可能会被拒绝。


2600 万美元的无人认领的 ETC 下场如何?


2018 年 1 月 10 日到期时,无人认领的资金下场会是如何?


  1. 由 WHG / Bity 保留资金作为他们的服务费用,退返回一些 ETC
  2. 捐赠给慈善机构或 “社区” ,ETC ,DTH 或 ETH 社区
  3. 再次延长最后期限
  4. 承诺允许无限期退出,就像ETH退出合同一样


Bity 的官方回应表示,他们可能倾向于方案二:

我们觉得这些资金应该捐给 DAO 加密货币持有者社区。 6 个月后,我们希望能够将这些无人认领的资金捐赠给全社会,如支持智能合约安全的基金会。我们希望这些资金能用来发展去中心化的管理制度,DAO和智能合约的结构与未来。我们到时会研究所有可行的方案。

资料来源: Bity


当然,谁来代表 “ DTH 社区 ” 是一个潜在问题,而这些资金使用是否存在透明度这件事情也可能会成为主要问题。由 WHG 的匿名特性,让社区去审计这些无人认领资金的开支的难度是很大的。

另外,这个随意的时间表防止了将来个人要会属于他自己资金的正当权利,这可能会导致未来法律争议。因此,WHG 有可能只剩下方案三和方案四,并且可能使得 ETC 提款无限期延长。

然而 2018 年 1 月来临时,DAO 事件将已经发生超过 18 个月,这在加密货币领域来说是一段很长的时间 。除此之外,自从 DAO 以来,ETH 和 ETC 的价格都大幅上涨。因此也许一些 DTH 已经被遗忘了,遗忘在了以太坊生态圈中的兴奋和财富累积的氛围。







BitMEX (www.bitmex.com)

Bitcoin’s unique value proposition

Abstract: In this piece, we examine the question of “What is Bitcoin for?” We conclude that neither low-cost payments, censorship resistance, nor digital payments are particularly compelling on their own. However, combining censorship-resistant money with the ability to use money electronically results in an interesting set of characteristics.


Click here to download the pdf version of this report



There has been a significant amount of debate and discussion in the Bitcoin ecosystem about what Bitcoin is for. Should Bitcoin be a form of digital gold with a robust rule set and resilient network as the priorities or should Bitcoin primarily be considered a payment system focused on low transaction fees?

Of course most people would like Bitcoin to excel in both of these areas and in the long term, Bitcoin may be able to do so. However, the blocksize debate opened a schism in the community about which should be the priority in the short to medium run.

There are three key characteristics of money and payment systems:

  1. low transaction fees and fast transactions,
  2. censorship resistance, and
  3. the ability to transact electronically.

One could make various choices when deciding which type of money to use and the set of characteristics that each choice provides. We look at where Bitcoin should position itself, such that it may be able to provide a unique option.

1. Low transaction fees

Low transaction fees and usability have clearly been a key selling point of Bitcoin. Bitcoin has had lower transaction fees than many online international-banking transfer systems and Western Union, for example. A simple user experience is key to adoption, and there is a fear that if user adoption is too slow, Bitcoin may lose out to alternative payments solutions, either traditional centralised systems or alternative distributed proof-of-work-based tokens such as Ethereum.

Although Bitcoin is cheaper and perhaps easier to use than some centralised alternatives, in many cases, centralised alternatives are faster and cheaper than Bitcoin. For example, in many Western European countries, retail domestic interbank transfers are both free and instant. In China, Alibaba (BABA US) and Tencent (700 HK) are offering fast, simple, and cheap payment solutions. Tencent is said to be able to handle 200,000 transactions per second, far exceeding what Bitcoin can achieve.

Some may see these offerings as a risk for Bitcoin while others see this as a battle Bitcoin was always going to lose anyway. Yet fast and free payments are not currently available to everyone in the world so Bitcoin can still fill a useful niche. However, is it really sustainable to build Bitcoin based on the assumption that traditional payment-solution providers won’t ever provide instant and free payments?

A shop window displays various electronic payment options, including Alipay, WeChat Pay, and Apple Pay. (Source: BitMEX Research)

2. Permissionless and censorship-resistant money

Other members of the Bitcoin community prioritise other features ahead of low fees. This is often characterized as “censorship resistance”, but may actually refer to a range of related properties. The main aspects of these features are:

  • the ability to use the system without seeking permission,
  • the inability of the government or other authorities to block payments,
  • the inability of the authorities to reverse payments, and
  • resistance against the entire system being shut down.

However, just like the use case of low transaction fees described above, these characteristics are also not unique. Physical cash (notes and coins) also have these features, again making Bitcoin seemingly useless. Physical cash not only has these features, it has them to a far greater extent than Bitcoin. Cash also has additional features that Bitcoin cannot offer, such as the ability to transact when communication networks are unavailable or without a device such as a smartphone.

It should be mentioned that Bitcoin may have one interesting feature here that physical cash does not have: the censorship resistance of the rules of the monetary system as a whole. Bitcoin end users may have the ability to enforce all the rules of the system, which cannot be said for physical cash. This ensures some interesting properties, such as the supply cap of 21 million or preventing other inflationary policies — not available as options for physical cash.  In this respect, Bitcoin can be said to be most like “digital gold”, in regards to its monetary characteristics.

The use cases of censorship-resistant money

These censorship-resistant features are sometimes associated with illegal activity, the so-called black market or grey market. Although there are of course many legitimate use cases for censorship resistance — for example, a lack of trust in your partner in the transaction or the high costs associated with enforcing payments in multiple jurisdictions.

Black-market uses could include things like tax evasion, money laundering, illegal drug dealing, sexual services, the sale of illegal weapons, bribery, and organized crime. Grey-market uses may be legal goods and services sold in an unauthorized way. Grey-market transactions could include:

  • remittance to or from a country imposing some form of capital controls;
  • an individual subject to political oppression that restricts the use of their funds;
  • purchasing products or services from a lower price or alternative region without the consent of the regulator, manufacturer, or service provider, such as pharmaceuticals, consumer electronics, or media-subscription services;
  • donations to a politically sensitive cause;
  • the sale of cars without proper registration;
  • the unauthorized sale of copyrighted material such as textbooks;
  • computer software or digital content sold without the correct licence;
  • unauthorized transactions in stocks and shares in the OTC market;
  • participation in online gambling or poker without meeting regulatory requirements;
  • event tickets sold in violation of the terms printed on the ticket;
  • the sale of airline loyalty points in the secondary market;
  • using online e-commerce systems or in-store mobile-payment technologies, without being old enough to have the necessary banking relationships;
  • a female using online e-commerce systems in a cultural environment where its socially unacceptable for females to have banking relationships;
  • payments for basic services such as babysitting without registration for sales tax or employment;
  • payments to a babysitter who has inappropriate immigration status; and
  • payments from intelligence services to informants.

These examples may make this use case somewhat controversial and many may think there could be limited upside due to a lack of demand for these goods and services. In our view, there is significant demand for this type of use case, indeed some estimate that these types of activities account for a significant proportion of global economic activity, depending on how it’s measured. For example a 2002 IMF report estimated that the underground economy accounted for 15% and 40% of economic activity in OECD and developing countries respectively.

Additionally, as we explained above, Bitcoin offers nothing new here. Physical cash already has the features that make it ideal for these scenarios and actually has superior qualities to Bitcoin in relation to censorship resistance. One key cultural difference is that physical cash is already deeply embedded in society, while Bitcoin is relatively new, making it potentially more controversial.

HSBC UK requires users to be over 18 years old to qualify for a credit card. Credit-card systems are typically used as the base layer for mobile payment technologies, and are therefore often inaccessible to those under 18 years of age, unlike cash which is permissionless. (Source: HSBC)

3. Electronic payments

As we enter the digital age, one characteristic of money trumps all of them: the ability to use money electronically, such that it can be used over the Internet or on a mobile device. Electronic communication systems have become integral parts of our culture and therefore the ability to use money electrically is an incredibly powerful feature.

However, Bitcoin certainly does not provide anything new here, either. Internet-based payment systems controlled by computer interfaces have existed for traditional currencies like the US dollar for years. Recently, the options available in this area are improving rapidly, with mobile payment systems gaining significant traction.

Evaluating the combinations of these three characteristics

After reading this far, one may conclude that Bitcoin has no unique characteristics whatsoever. This is true to some extent — but the key value proposition of Bitcoin is a unique combination of the above characteristics, namely to have both censorship resistance and an electronic transaction system. This subtlety can make the value proposition of Bitcoin difficult to understand, resulting in significant scepticism when one first comes across the subject.

The table below aims to illustrate the three key features discussed in this piece. We outline two alternative strategies for Bitcoin, one prioritising low transaction fees and the other prioritising censorship resistance. The analysis is oversimplified, assuming a binary choice between one or the other when the reality is far more nuanced, but it still makes a point.

When choosing to prioritise low fees, the boxes ticked in the table below are identical to those ticked for traditional electronic payment systems, which can already provide both low fees and electronic payments. However, a focus on censorship resistance ticks a unique set of boxes, meaning that Bitcoin provides a unique set of features that cannot be offered by any of the competing systems. No other monetary or payment system is able to offer both censorship resistance and electronic payments. Therefore, however vitally we value low transaction fees, the smart choice may be to prioritise the strategy that provides the most unique combination of characteristics. This could mean choosing censorship resistance rather than focusing on what appears to be the most immediately useful requirement.

Ability to offer low transaction fees Ability to offer censorship resistant type features Ability to transact electronically
Physical cash
Bank deposit/traditional electronic payment systems
Bitcoin (Priority: Low fees)
Bitcoin (Priority: Censorship resistance)

Of course, Bitcoin still needs to balance both the need for low fees and censorship resistance, and hopefully can achieve both, perhaps with new technology. In the medium or longer term, perhaps all three boxes in the above table can be ticked.


The point of Bitcoin is to provide characteristics traditionally only available when using physical cash, but in electronic form, suitable for the digital age: an “electronic cash system“. It’s a false dichotomy to believe we are facing a choice between a “digital gold” and a cash-type system. Bitcoin can be considered a hybrid of digital gold, physical cash, and traditional electronic payment systems.














  1. 稳定且均衡状态是存在的,每个加密货币大致达到其10分钟的目标区块间隔时间,并且哈希散布率与每个加密货币的价格成比例地分配。
  2. 比特币现金的价格上涨。
  3. 比特币现金的挖矿所带来的盈利会比特币高,大量的哈希率便转移到比特币现金。
  4. 在一天之内,比特币现金的难度重新定位机制很快就会调整,比特币现金区块的间隔时间在10分钟左右。
  5. 由于比特币现金的难度提高了,部分哈希率会回到比特币区块链上。比特币区块间隔超过10分钟,因为并不是所有的哈希率都同一时间转移回来。
  6. 在大约两周后,比特币的难度重新定位机制就会调整,而比特币的区块间隔再次达到10分钟。更大的哈希值回到比特币,这样哈希率分布大致与两个加密货币相对价格(一个均衡状态)成比例。




哈希率动态波动图 – 比特币现金的价格上升时

初始状态 价格上涨后 比特币现金难度调整后 比特币难度调整后
比特币 1.0 BTC 1.0 BTC 1.0 BTC 1.0 BTC
比特币现金 0.2 BTC 0.4 BTC 0.4 BTC 0.4 BTC
比特币 1.00x 1.00x 1.00x 1.17x
比特币现金 1.00x 2.00x 1.00x 1.17x
比特币 83.3% 0.0% 66.7% 71.4%
比特币现金 16.7% 100.0% 33.3% 28.6%
比特币 10 分钟 n/a 12.5 分钟 10 分钟
比特币现金 10 分钟 1.7 分钟 10 分钟 10 分钟

资料来源:BitMEX 研究



















BitMEX (www.bitmex.com)







年份 加密货币 哈希算法
2014 莱特币(LTC) vs 狗币(DOGE) Scrypt
2016 以太币(ETC) vs 以太币经典(ETC) EtHash
2017 比特币(BTC) vs 比特币现金(BCH) SHA256

资料来源:BitMEX 研究















图1 – 2014年莱特币(LTC)与狗币(DOGE)价格图 – 美元

资料来源:Coinmarketcap,BitMEX 研究




图2 – 2014年莱特币(LTC)与狗币(DOGE)市值表 – 百万美元



图3 – 2014年莱特币(LTC)与狗币(DOGE)哈希率图 – 每秒十亿次哈希






图4 – 2014年莱特币(LTC)与狗币(DOGE) – 采矿激励(美元/日)vs 哈希率

资料来源:Coinmarketcap,莱特币区块链,狗币区块链,狗币 Github,BitMEX 研究





图5 – 狗币(DOGE)2014活动时间表

日期 区块数 事件类别 预计区块奖励 注解
二月十四日  100,000 采矿奖励变更  250,000 500,000 随机奖励0到50万个狗币
三月十七日  145,000 硬分叉 250,000 250,000 难度再定位时间从4小时减少到1分钟。随机性从区块奖励中删除了。
四月二十八日  200,000 采矿奖励变更 125,000 250,000
七月十五日  300,000 采矿奖励变更 62,500 125,000
九月十一日  371,337 硬分叉 启用了兼容莱特币的合并挖矿
十月二日  400,000 采矿奖励变更 31,250 62,500
十二月十四日  500,000 采矿奖励变更 15,625 31,250















BitMEX (www.bitmex.com)